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Presidential Control of Elections
Lisa Marshall Manheim*
In recent decades, presidents of both political parties have asserted
increasingly aggressive forms of influence over the administrative state. During
this same period, Congress has expanded the role that the federal government
plays in election administration. The convergence of these two trends leads to a
troubling but underexamined phenomenon: presidential control of elections.
Relying on their official powers, presidents have the ability to affect the rules
that govern elections, including elections meant to check and legitimize
presidential powers in the first place. This self-serving arrangement heightens
the risk of harms from political entrenchment and subordination of expertise.
These harms, in turn, threaten to compromise election outcomes. By extension,
they also threaten the electoral connection purportedly underlying the
administrative state and, therefore, the legitimacy of the work of the modern
executive branch.
This Article identifies, defines, and examines this phenomenon—
presidential control of elections—and explores its broader implications. It
demonstrates that, across the executive branch, this phenomenon manifests
differently, and sometimes counterintuitively, in ways that tend to track how
Congress has structured the relevant grant of power. Three forms dominate,
with presidents influencing election administration primarily through priority
setting (for grants of power running through executive agencies), promotion of
gridlock (for grants of power running through independent agencies), and
idiosyncratic control (for grants of power running directly to the president). This
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analysis reveals that congressional efforts at insulation at times can backfire,
with presidents able to exercise particularly problematic forms of control over
agencies that Congress designed in blunt ways to resist presidential influence.
To that end, this Article proposes that Congress and the courts avoid trying to
eliminate or otherwise indiscriminately curb presidential control of elections—
a quixotic endeavor that would give rise to its own constitutional challenges and
normative harms. Instead, the legislative and judicial branches should identify
specific areas where the president’s control over election administration lacks
an effective check and seek to empower other political actors in those spaces.
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INTRODUCTION
Elections ensure accountability in the executive branch. Or, at
least, that’s the theory offered in support of the administrative state.1
1.
See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority Over
Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2483 (2011) (“A central argument for the legitimacy of
the administrative state, including its priority-setting and resolution of value-laden questions, has
been that agencies are accountable to the President, who is in turn accountable to the electorate.”
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The trouble comes in what this theory ignores: that the President of the
United States is empowered by law to influence election
administration.2 By exercising his official powers, a president can affect
the rules of the elections that purport to hold him accountable, even
when the changes would benefit him personally. This exercise of
authority is problematic. It threatens to undermine the democratic will
and delegitimize the executive branch.3
This Article investigates this phenomenon, which it calls
presidential control of elections.4 It defines this phenomenon as a
president’s lawful exercise of power over the interpretation and
implementation of election rules.5 The process starts in the legislative
branch, where Congress enacts statutes implicating election
administration. The executive branch then works to implement these
mandates. This arrangement ensures presidential control of some sort,
with congressional design shaping the precise form it takes. As this
(footnote omitted)); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499
(2010) (offering this electoral connection as a necessary prerequisite to the administrative state
and noting that “[o]ur Constitution was adopted to enable the people to govern themselves,
through their elected leaders”); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984) (explaining that while “agencies are not directly accountable to the people,” the
president is accountable); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2255 (2001) (congressional elections); Kagan, supra, at 2332 (presidential elections); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
81 (1985) (discussing delegation to administrators). But see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond
Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461,
462 (2003) (criticizing these arguments while acknowledging their prominence in administrative
theory, which is “fixated on . . . political accountability”); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
Accountability Claims in Constitutional Law, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 989, 992 (2018) (calling into
question the empirical basis of these arguments while acknowledging that “the Court’s
accountability claims” serve as “pillars of some of the most consequential holdings in all of
constitutional law”).
2.
See infra Part II (exploring how presidents exercise control in the context of
election administration).
3.
See infra Part III (discussing the normative implications of presidential control over
elections and how, if at all, this phenomenon should be curbed).
4.
When referring to “presidential control” in this context, this Article means to include not
only control exercised by the president himself, but also control exercised by the president’s highlevel staff in the White House and the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”). See Kate Andrias,
The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1040 (2013) (relying on similar
terminology); id. (“[The President’s White House and EOP advisors] are not the President, and
there may, at times, be space between their varying agendas and his. But, as political scientists
have shown, the most senior level of the bureaucracy is relatively cabined and controlled.” (footnote
omitted)); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative
State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006)
(“Presidential control is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’ ”). This Article alternates male and female pronouns
when referring generically to the president.
5.
This Article uses the term “election rules” in an expansive manner to include, for example,
rules governing voter registration, structuring of the voting process, redistricting, voting rights,
campaign finance, election crimes, and election security. It uses the term “election administration”
in an analogously expansive way. See infra Part I (exploring the federal government’s role
in elections).
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Article demonstrates, Congress predominantly relies on three basic
legal structures when authorizing the executive branch to administer
election laws. On the most basic level, these three structures operate
through an executive agency, an independent agency, or the
president himself.
The first structure employs executive agencies. When Congress
has empowered these agencies to execute election-related mandates, it
has done so primarily through limited grants of power that do not
include rulemaking authority. In response, presidents have controlled
election administration chiefly by influencing how agencies prioritize
their work. Much of this influence manifests in enforcement practices.6
As an example, consider the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). Among the
many election-related statutes administered by DOJ is the National
Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”). When enforcing the NVRA,
administrations led by Republican presidents have tended to prioritize
enforcement of one set of mandates: those requiring states to remove
names from the voting rolls. Administrations led by Democratic
presidents have tended to prioritize enforcement of the opposite set of
mandates: those requiring states to retain names on the voting rolls.
Despite perfunctory claims of neutrality, political appointees in both
administrations understand this shift in enforcement prioritization to
favor the electoral prospects of one political party over the other.
Presidents perpetuate these patterns in part by using their nomination
and removal powers to ensure that high-level DOJ officials prioritize
their preferred approach.7
The second congressional structure employs independent
agencies. In the context of elections, Congress tends to rely on agencies
with a somewhat unusual leadership arrangement: an even-numbered,
bipartisan commission protected from at-will removal by the president.
In response to these insulated grants of authority, presidents have
exercised meaningful control over election administration primarily
through the promotion of gridlock—or not at all.8 The Federal Election
Commission (“FEC”) provides a prominent example. The FEC plays an
important role in election administration, as Congress has charged it
with implementing federal campaign finance statutes. Yet the agency
has been notorious for its inaction. At best, the Commission has been
beset with stalemates; at worst, the agency has lacked the ability, under
6.
See infra Section II.A (addressing how presidents exercise control of elections through
executive agencies).
7.
See infra notes 120–122 (discussing DOJ’s implementation of the NVRA); see also infra
notes 89–96 (addressing the role that nomination and removal powers play in presidential control).
8.
See infra Section II.B (addressing how presidents exercise control of elections through
independent agencies).
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law, to take even the most basic of actions necessary to fulfill its
statutory mandates. From the perspective of a president who prefers
relaxed enforcement of the campaign-finance statutes, such dysfunction
is a feature, not a bug. Presidents preferring a gridlocked agency can
readily induce this dysfunction by, for example, simply refusing to
nominate commissioners to fill open spots on the Commission.
Presidents preferring a more vigorous enforcement regime, by contrast,
generally have no effective mechanism to force the agency into action.
This dynamic helps to explain why, heading into the 2020 elections, the
FEC had before it an enormous backlog of work—including multiple,
serious complaints concerning a sitting president’s reelection
campaign—but no legal means by which to tackle these tasks. 9
The third congressional form relies on narrow grants of power
running directly to the president. In response to these delegations,
presidents have exercised powers in idiosyncratic ways.10 Congress has
empowered the president, for example, to unilaterally impose sanctions
in response to foreign election interference, as Obama did; or to refuse
to impose those sanctions, as Trump did.11 The law also allows a
president to create a bipartisan, blue-ribbon commission to investigate
“[the] best practices . . . to promote the efficient administration of
elections” (Obama); or a highly politicized, divisive commission to
investigate the “integrity of the voting processes” (Trump).12 When
presidents exercise these unilateral, election-related powers, it is
difficult to identify crosscutting patterns—except to recognize that the
decisions tend to reflect the idiosyncratic preferences of each president.
Each of these examples reflects a different mechanism of
presidential control. Yet in all these illustrations, the nation’s most
prominent elected official is seeking more than simply to influence how
he and other candidates fare at the polls. Instead, each involves a
president seeking to influence how the actual rules governing elections
are interpreted and implemented. This exercise of authority therefore
goes well beyond the bully pulpit.

9.
See infra notes 164–191 and accompanying text (exploring the phenomenon of controlling
election administration through the promotion of gridlock).
10. See infra Section II.C (addressing how presidents exercise control of elections through
direct grants of power).
11. See infra notes 220–227 and accompanying text (considering sanctions associated with
foreign interference in elections).
12. Exec. Order No. 13,639, 78 Fed. Reg. 19,979 (Mar. 28, 2013) (Obama’s executive order
establishing the Presidential Commission on Election Administration); Exec. Order No. 13,799, 82
Fed. Reg. 22,389 (May 11, 2017) (Trump’s executive order establishing the Presidential Advisory
Commission on Election Integrity); see infra notes 209–219 and accompanying text (discussing
advisory commissions that address election administration).
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Presidential control of this sort threatens democratic
accountability.13 Elections, after all, are supposed to be what legitimize
and check the president’s exercise of official powers in the first place.
To the extent that the nation’s elections—presidential, congressional,
and otherwise—are suspect, so too is the allocation of presidential
power they purport to authorize.14 A central concern in this context
relates to entrenchment, a term this Article uses to refer to officials
“manipulating the ground rules of the democratic process in order to
retain their hold on power.”15 Particularly at its extremes,
entrenchment calls into question whether an election meaningfully
reflects the will of the electorate and otherwise upholds basic
democratic values.16 To the extent that a president is able to influence
the administration of election rules, he potentially is able to engage in
the problematic practice of entrenchment.17
The normative implications of entrenchment are familiar in the
world of election law, where scholars have long expressed concerns over
incumbents controlling election administration. State legislators draw
maps governing races in which they then run; state secretaries of state
preside over the administration of their own elections.18 Foxes, in short,

13. See infra Section III.A (analyzing the normative implications of presidential control).
14. See infra Section III.A; see also sources cited supra note 1 (discussing the purported
connection between elections and accountability in the executive branch); LISA MANHEIM &
KATHRYN WATTS, THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE LAW (2018)
(discussing how presidential power is checked and legitimized not only through presidential
elections, but also through congressional as well as state and local elections).
15. Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE
L.J. 400, 408 (2015); cf. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2509–25 (2019) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (discussing politicians’ attempts to use their legislative power over electoral lines “to
entrench themselves in office as against voters’ preferences”); Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d
837, 886 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (“The danger with extreme partisan
gerrymanders is that they entrench a political party in power, making that party—and therefore
the state government—impervious to the interests of citizens affiliated with other political
parties.”). See generally Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment
Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 502–09 (1997) (discussing legislative and cross-temporal entrenchment
problems). This Article relies on this definition of entrenchment while recognizing that
reasonable minds can, and do, disagree as to what type—and how much—of this manipulation is
normatively acceptable.
16. See infra Section III.A.
17. See infra Section III.A.
18. See also Lisa Marshall Manheim & Elizabeth G. Porter, The Elephant in the Room:
Intentional Voter Suppression, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 232–33, 249–52 (2018) (discussing
restrictive voting measures and their perceived connection to incumbents’ electoral prospects);
David Schultz, Less than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the Coming of the Second
Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 493 (2008) (criticizing election
administrators’ apparent efforts to construe election rules in their party’s favor); Richard Fausset,
‘Large-Scale Reforms’ of Georgia Elections Sought in Federal Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/27/us/georgia-elections-federal-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/
JF6W-YSWV] (describing a lawsuit brought against Georgia by Stacey Abrams).
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routinely guard the henhouse.19 These self-serving arrangements lead
to extraordinarily difficult questions relating to constitutional law,
political theory, institutionalism, and beyond.20 Accordingly, election
law scholars have produced a rich and varied body of work exploring
how these concerns unfold—at least, in the context of state governance.
Yet very little of this vast literature explores how these concepts might
apply, much less identifies the unique difficulties that arise, when the
fox sits at the head of the federal executive branch.21
19. Cf. Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 650 (2002) (offering
a defense of political gerrymandering).
20. For a sampling of the many scholarly works of note that explore these questions, see, for
example, Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601 (2007);
Edward B. Foley, The Separation of Electoral Powers, 74 MONT. L. REV. 139 (2013); Heather K.
Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 503, 517–18 (2004); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116
HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging
Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 668–
69 (2006); Lisa Marshall Manheim, Redistricting Litigation and the Delegation of Democratic
Design, 93 B.U. L. REV. 563 (2013); Persily, supra note 19; Saul Zipkin, Administering Election
Law, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 641, 643 (2012) (“In recent years, commentators and judges have displayed
heightened concern about political actors making decisions about the electoral process on partisan
or incumbent-protecting bases, and have called for greater policing of this dynamic.”); Zipkin,
supra, at 647–60 (summarizing many of these arguments).
21. The gap might be due in part to historical patterns. Presidential control of elections occurs
at the intersection of two complicated phenomena: (1) presidential control over the administrative
state, and (2) federal involvement in election administration. The first phenomenon has grown, in
some respects considerably, over the last several decades. See Kagan, supra note 1 (exploring the
nature of presidential control); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 683 (2016) (same, with a focus on the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and
Barack Obama); Daniel A. Farber, Presidential Administration Under Trump (Aug. 8, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3015591 [https://perma.cc/WWA9-839Z]
(same, with a focus on the administration of President Trump). The second phenomenon also has
grown over the last several decades. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45302, FEDERAL
ROLE IN U.S. CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS: AN OVERVIEW (2018). The overlap of these two trends
has become increasingly clear in recent years. Historically, presidents have tended to exercise
election-related powers in relatively discreet and opaque ways. But the hyperpartisan nature of
the Trump and late-Obama eras—particularly when coupled with the governing style and
disregard for norms that dominated much of Trump’s tenure—has stripped away much of this
subtlety. See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187 (2018)
(examining the loosening of relevant norms during these years); see also infra note 27 (discussing
polarization). Another explanation for this gap in the literature may involve frustrations with the
difficulties that legal scholars—and, even more so, courts—have encountered when attempting to
reach any consensus at all in response to similar election-related issues in more familiar contexts.
To take but one of many illustrations, half a century after the Supreme Court announced its
willingness to consider the constitutionality of redistricting plans, it simply gave up on its efforts
to identify a working standard for adjudicating even the most extreme forms of partisan
gerrymandering. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, Déjà Vu All Over Again: Courts,
Corporate Law, and Election Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 86, 86 (2013) (arguing that “this debate in
election law has run its course”); see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (holding
that partisan gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable). The Court seems similarly disinterested
in tackling other troubling attempts at entrenchment. See, e.g., Manheim & Porter, supra note 18
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This Article urges far greater attention. When the politician
attempting to entrench herself is one of the most powerful officials in
the world, warning bells should ring. The stakes are particularly high
in light of the vast implications for policy, given that the law authorizes
the President of the United States to wield a staggering amount of
power both at home and abroad.22 The stakes are similarly high with
respect to legitimacy, given that the federal executive branch, staffed
by millions, has but one elected official in its ranks.23 A president’s
control over elections therefore threatens to undermine the legitimacy
not only of his own work, but the work of the entire federal
administrative state.24 To add even further to these concerns, the law
allows the president to act without the tempering force offered by other
elected executive branch officials (as in state systems) or a
multimember legislative body.25 These stakes amplify concerns over
entrenchment and legitimacy. These concerns exist even when the
president acts in a manner that is at least plausibly consistent with the
law—the class of activities explored in this Article. When a sitting
president brazenly acts outside of the law to influence election
administration, these concerns grow even more acute.26
(discussing the Court’s unwillingness to push back on restrictive voting measures); infra notes 54–
56 and accompanying text (discussing current scholarly landscape).
22. See generally MANHEIM & WATTS, supra note 14 (providing an overview of
presidential power).
23. There is, however, a notable exception: as Joshua Ulan Galperin has explained, the
United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) relies in part on elected administrators. See
Joshua Ulan Galperin, The Life of Administrative Democracy, 108 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1214–32 (2020)
(exploring the USDA’s unique “elected farmer committee system”—which is composed of nearly
eight thousand elected farmer representatives across over two thousand county committees—and
questioning whether it is constitutional). Despite this little-known exception in the USDA, the
overarching observation—that the President of the United States is, with only nominal exceptions,
the sole elected official within the federal executive branch—remains accurate and on point. Cf.
id. at 1216 (describing the common understanding of the federal executive branch as “unelected”
outside of the president). It is noteworthy that Galperin finds little to recommend in the narrow
slice of electoral accountability that the federal executive branch incorporates outside of the Office
of the President. See id. at 1252 (“[E]lectoral administration is not something to strive for. . . .
[Elections in this context] give rise to obvious, undesirable majoritarian consequences and, unlike
a constitutional system that checks raw majoritarianism, the administrative system has limited
tools for that job.”); see also Joshua Ulan Galperin, The Death of Administrative Democracy, 82 U.
PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
24. See infra Section III.A (discussing the normative implications of presidential control).
25. See infra Section III.A (same).
26. Discussions exploring this latter sort of conduct—clearly unlawful attempts by a
president to affect election administration—are of the utmost importance. Indeed, the significance
of these discussions became increasingly clear as this Article entered the final stages of the
publication process, which occurred during the 2020 presidential election and its aftermath. Even
prior to this time, allegations of improper presidential interference had threatened the democratic
process and toppled one presidency. See, e.g., Eileen Shanahan, An Explanation: The Allegations
of Nixon’s I.R.S. Interference, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 1974), https://www.nytimes.com/1974/06/14/
archives/an-explanation-the-allegatoins-of-nixons-irs-interference-many.html [https://perma.cc/
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All these anxieties exacerbate a ballooning crisis of legitimacy
that the federal government has been straining to weather.27 No
panacea exists for this broader predicament. Still, as this Article seeks
to explain, there may be ways to meaningfully temper some of the
problems associated with presidential control over election rules.28
Appropriate reforms would begin by identifying areas where presidents
influence election administration with little meaningful check. Other
actors—particularly those in the federal legislative and judicial
branches—could then be enlisted to impose more of a counterweight in
these spaces.
This Article explores these issues in three parts. Part I describes
the role of the federal executive branch in the design and
administration of elections. It begins with an overview of the
interlocking set of federalist frameworks that govern how elections are
run in the United States, before turning to how Congress has
empowered the executive branch of the federal government to
participate in this process. It concludes with the role of the chief
36QD-TXTL] (describing why President Nixon’s alleged interference with the IRS constituted an
indictable criminal offense); see also I.R.C. § 7212.
In the lead-up to the 2020 elections, allegations of illegal election-related interference by the
President proved all the more alarming. Multiple actions that President Trump was alleged to
have taken, or had threatened to take, involved attempts at presidential control of elections that,
if carried out, would be unlawful under well-established understandings of legal limits. For one
illustration of many, consider Trump’s threat to send “sheriffs” and other “law enforcement” to the
polls to “cross check” and otherwise engage with voters. Justine Coleman, Trump Says He Will
Send Law Enforcement, US Attorneys to Polls in November to Prevent Fraud, HILL (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/513048-trump-says-he-will-send-law-enforcementus-attorneys-to-polls-in [https://perma.cc/F5JP-ASE6]; cf. Barton Gellman, How Trump Could
Attempt a Coup, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2020/11/how-trump-could-attempt-coup/616954/ [https://perma.cc/U4L5-VYBL] (brainstorming
ways in which a president could misuse his power to subvert election results).
After the election, additional allegations concerning President Trump’s conduct raised even
more trepidation over presidential attempts to subvert the election process through illegal action.
See Jim Rutenberg, Jo Becker, Eric Lipton, Maggie Haberman, Jonathan Martin, Matthew
Rosenberg & Michael S. Schmidt, 77 Days: Trump’s Campaign to Subvert the Election, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/us/trump-election-lie.html (last updated Feb. 12, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/2ZC9-3MFU] (describing, among other forms of malfeasance, attempts by Trump
to convince high-level officials at DOJ to investigate bogus claims of election improprieties and
pressure state election officials into subverting election results); see also sources cited infra note
265. Despite the significance of these developments, unlawful conduct by a president still remains
one degree removed from the topic this Article examines: how lawful actions, taken by the
president in his official capacity, can affect the administration of elections.
27. Trust and confidence in federal government is as low as it has been in decades, and
political partisanship is as high. See Megan Brenan, Americans’ Trust in Government to Handle
Problems at New Low, GALLUP (Jan. 31, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/246371/americanstrust-government-handle-problems-new-low.aspx [https://perma.cc/DF34-5SLW]; Alec Tyson,
America’s Polarized Views of Trump Follow Years of Growing Political Partisanship, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/14/americas-polarizedviews-of-trump-follow-years-of-growing-political-partisanship/ [https://perma.cc/N6VG-X5FV].
28. See infra Section III.B (offering prescriptive responses to presidential control of elections).
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executive, explaining how presidents attempt to harness the legal
powers that run to the executive branch through a complicated dynamic
that continues to evolve.
Part II pulls these discussions together for the descriptive work
at the heart of this Article: a discussion of the ways that modern U.S.
presidents use their official powers to affect election rules across the
country. As this Part reveals, the ways that presidents exercise power
depend heavily on the structures imposed by Congress. To that end,
Section II.A begins by analyzing presidential control of executive
agencies, where presidents have exercised influence over elections
primarily through priority setting. Section II.B turns to independent
agencies, where control through gridlock has been the prominent means
of White House influence over election administration. Section II.C
explores direct grants of election-related power to the president. These
grants of power have been exercised in ways that track presidents’ own
idiosyncratic preferences. Section II.D concludes with an explanation of
why presidential control over elections, at least in some form, is
inevitable, and it provides reasons why this phenomenon may be poised
to expand in the future.
Part III pivots to the normative and prescriptive implications of
presidential control of elections. It begins with an examination of the
deep normative concerns raised by this phenomenon. It explores the
possibility that presidential control of elections both undermines
expertise in election administration and facilitates entrenchment. This
dynamic has negative implications for elections, as it calls into question
the extent to which affected elections reflect the democratic will. This
dynamic also has negative implications for the administrative state, as
presidential control in this context threatens to undermine two of the
values most vital to the modern federal executive branch: technocratic
expertise and political accountability. All these possible effects are
troubling, though also difficult to measure empirically. Having
identified these concerns, Part III turns to the question of how best to
respond. In so doing, it resists the impulse to try to completely eliminate
this problematic form of control. It demonstrates instead the value in
more targeted reforms that allow the other branches—legislative and
judicial—to more effectively check the chief executive in areas
where, at present, there is little to offset presidential control over
election administration.
Throughout, this Article directs its analysis toward presidential
efforts that seek to influence election rules, as opposed to mere voter
preferences. A president, of course, takes any number of actions to
increase the likelihood of victory at the polls. This Article explores only
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a subset of these presidential actions: those that affect how election
rules are interpreted and implemented.29
This Article also focuses on presidential actions that are at least
plausibly consistent with the law. It does not, in other words, explore a
president’s attempts to swing elections by brazenly flouting the
Constitution or Congress’s statutes.30 To that end, this Article does not
attempt to integrate into its analysis the unlawful actions that
President Trump allegedly took after the 2020 elections. Such analysis
would require a shift in attention—away from how a president is
empowered by law to influence election rules, which is the focus of this
Article, to concentrate instead on an important but distinct question:
how a sitting president might attempt to control elections and their
outcomes through unlawful means.31 At times, of course, the law is too
unsettled, or opaque, to draw a clear line between lawful and unlawful
actions.32 A line nevertheless exists.
Particularly on the margins, all these lines are rough. Still, they
help to concentrate this Article’s analysis in a way that more effectively
brings to light the nature and implications of the phenomenon it
seeks to expose: how presidents use the powers of their office to
control elections.
I. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN ELECTIONS
The field of election law is founded on the insight that election
rules affect election outcomes. Who runs, who votes, and—eventually—
who wins depends, at least in part, on the legal decisions determining
how a jurisdiction runs its elections. Though these causal relationships
tend to be difficult to measure,33 they nevertheless exist, and they
confirm the importance of the legal structures that undergird elections.
29. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text (further defining relevant terms).
30. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing allegations of presidents
acting unlawfully).
31. Congress has vested the president with vanishingly little control over the resolution of
disputed elections. As a result, “to the extent that a President can exploit his office to influence a
disputed presidential election, it is not through law-based means.” See Lisa Marshall Manheim,
Presidential Control over Disputed Elections, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 215, 218 (2020); see also id.
(“The President has essentially no legal authority, by virtue of his office, to control the resolution
of disputed presidential elections. He also has no legal authority to control the decisions of officials
who will dictate the outcome of such disputes.”); sources cited infra note 265 (identifying
unsuccessful attempts by Trump to subvert the results of the 2020 presidential election).
32. An example comes in the nebulous legal lines emerging out of recent litigation over the
Census. See infra notes 145–155 and accompanying text (discussing the attempt by the Census
Bureau to add a citizenship question to the short form questionnaire).
33. See Manheim & Porter, supra note 18, at 214 (noting the difficulty of measuring the effect
of voting restrictions); see also infra notes 313–314 and accompanying text (discussing the electoral
connection between voters, the president, and the administrative state).
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With these relationships in mind, this Part provides an overview of
the legal regimes through which federal officials exercise control over
U.S. elections.
A. Federalism in Election Administration
In the decentralized system adopted by the United States, the
federal government does not itself conduct elections. Instead, elections
are run by state and local governments, with limited but important
oversight and regulation by the federal government. The Constitution
sets this balance, at the outset, by recognizing the primary role that
states play in administering elections, both state and federal.34 It then
imposes direct obligations and limitations on the states. These
constitutional limitations include provisions requiring states to hold
elections for congressional offices,35 as well as provisions protecting
voters’ rights against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and
more.36 The Constitution also assigns to Congress the authority to
preempt state election-related regulation, particularly with respect to
federal elections.37 It further grants to Congress the power to enact
legislation counteracting some forms of discrimination in voting.38 In
the context of elections, much has been written about this federalist
balance of power.39
Empowered by the Constitution’s grants of authority, Congress

34. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”);
id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); see also Growe v.
Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) (“[T]he Constitution leaves with the States primary responsibility
for apportionment of their federal congressional and state legislative districts.”). Exceptions come
in requirements associated with the Census, which primarily impose obligations on the federal
government, as well as with respect to elections occurring in the District of Columbia.
35. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (addressing elections
for the House); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (addressing elections for the Senate); id. amend. XVII (same); cf.
id. art. II, § 1 (addressing election of the president); id. amend. XII (same).
36. See id. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI (addressing the right to vote); see also id. amend.
XIV, § 2. Some of the Constitution’s protections of the right to vote are more textually grounded
than others. See Manheim & Porter, supra note 18, at 240 (noting that a broadly applicable right
to vote, which federal courts have for decades recognized as constitutionally grounded, is generally
understood to reside in the Fourteenth Amendment but nevertheless lacks a clear textual hook).
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (granting Congress the power to create and alter
regulations for congressional elections, except for rules concerning place).
38. See id. amend. XIV, § 5 (granting Congress enforcement power); id. amend. XV, § 2
(same); id. amend. XIX, § 2 (same); id. amend. XXIV, § 2 (same); id. amend. XXVI, § 2 (same).
39. See, e.g., Travis Crum, The Superfluous Fifteenth Amendment?, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1549
(2020) (arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment significantly expanded Congress’s ability to
regulate voting rights); Franita Tolson, The Spectrum of Congressional Authority Over Elections,
99 B.U. L. REV. 317 (2019).
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has enacted a number of election-related statutes.40 The most important
have addressed the design of elections themselves, including with
respect to race and voting rights, as well as voting systems and voter
access.41 Beginning in the 1970s, Congress also began regulating
heavily in the area of campaign finance.42 More recently, due to
concerns over election security, federal officials have taken steps to
trigger statutory provisions that help to protect election
infrastructure.43 Other federal statutes implicate elections in other
important ways.44 Commentators have written extensively about these
forms of congressional control.45
As a result of Congress’s activity in this area, recent decades
have seen an expansion in the role that the federal government plays
40. See GARRETT, supra note 21, at 1 (“Currently, no single agency or statute provides
overarching coordination. As this report shows, at least 22 congressional committees; 17 federal
departments or independent agencies (plus the Intelligence Community and the federal judiciary);
9 federal statutes; and several constitutional provisions can affect the federal role in campaigns
and elections.”).
41. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; National Voter
Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77; Help America Vote Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666; Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No.
99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (1986); Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-435, 98 Stat. 1678 (1984); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327.
42. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972);
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
43. See infra notes 63–65, 101–103 (discussing developments at the Department of Homeland
Security).
44. Some of these relate to contested elections. See Federal Contested Elections Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-138, 83 Stat. 284; see also Lisa Marshall Manheim, Judging Congressional
Elections, 51 GA. L. REV. 359 (2017) (discussing ambiguity in Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution
regarding the role, if any, of the courts in adjudicating contested congressional elections). Congress
also has enacted the Electoral Count Act of 1887, 3 U.S.C. § 5. See EDWARD B. FOLEY, BALLOT
BATTLES: THE HISTORY OF DISPUTED ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2016). A range of criminal
statutes also involve elections. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF
ELECTION OFFENSES (Richard C. Pilger ed., 8th ed. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/
file/1029066/download [https://perma.cc/7YLU-QHY4]. Many other statutes affect elections in
limited ways, or incidentally. See GARRETT, supra note 21, at 12; see also Jennifer Nou, Subregulating Elections, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 135 (surveying federal election-related agencies in the
course of offering broader critiques). Many of these statutes apply only to federal elections, and
not to state elections—a distinction that reflects, among other considerations, the greater range of
authority Congress has to regulate federal elections. Yet a number of these statutory provisions
also govern state and local elections. And even when the terms of a congressional statute only
reach federal elections, often the practical effect extends to state elections as well. This practical
effect adheres, among other reasons, because most states administer state and federal elections
concurrently. See Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement,
89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 402 (2014) (discussing how, particularly with respect to issues of federalism,
“congressional authority to regulate elections falls along a spectrum”). But see Michael Morley,
Dismantling the Unitary Electoral System? Uncooperative Federalism in State and Local Election,
111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 103 (2017) (distinguishing between federal elections, on the one hand,
and state and local elections, on the other, and explaining how that connection relates to electionrelated policies adopted by the federal government).
45. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 39 (discussing congressional control over elections).
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in election administration.46 Moreover, political pressure now appears
to be mounting on the federal government to further increase its
involvement, particularly with respect to election security and
voting rights.47
Alongside the federal legislative branch, the federal judicial
branch also exercises power under the Constitution in a manner that
affects elections, including by helping to interpret relevant rules and
restrictions.48 Courts, for example, have developed a complicated set of
legal frameworks to accompany the open-ended language of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”). They also have adjudicated the
constitutionality of campaign finance restrictions in a way that has
shaped the surviving legal regime in profound ways. 49 An enormous and
ever-growing body of scholarship addresses the role of the federal courts
in election law, including with respect to an ongoing debate over the
courts’ capacity to handle this field’s most difficult problems.50
Subject to far less scholarly commentary, but at least as
important, is the role in elections played by the remaining branch of the
federal government: the executive branch.
B. The Role of the Federal Executive Branch
Through a patchwork combination of statutes, regulations,
constitutional law, and more, the federal government reaches subtly,
but strikingly, into the administration of elections. This arrangement
necessarily
empowers
executive
branch
officials—including
the president.
A very brief explanation of executive branch policymaking helps
to set the stage. When Congress enacts a statute, it relies on the
president or an agency to administer it—which, in turn, has the
practical effect of granting to the executive branch a narrow, but
46. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 21, at 1 (“Congress has expanded the federal role in
campaigns and elections in the past 50 years . . . .”). But cf. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529
(2013) (holding section 4 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) unconstitutional). My use of the term
“election administration” in this context is meant to be broad and, accordingly, to include statutes
affecting redistricting, campaign finance, the Census, and more. See supra notes 4–5
(defining terms).
47. See infra notes 278–280 and accompanying text (citing election security proposals).
48. To this end, consider not only constitutional law, but also the large body of case law
addressing statutory—and to a lesser extent regulatory—enforcement. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox &
Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (analyzing judges’
varied interpretations of the VRA).
49. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (construing section 2 of the VRA);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (adjudicating the constitutionality of the Federal Election
Campaign Act).
50. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 19–21 (identifying works illustrative in this field).
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significant, degree of de facto policymaking authority in the relevant
area of law. This policymaking can occur in different ways. For example,
it can occur through interpretation of statutes in a manner that favors
particular policy ends, including with respect to the promulgation of
regulations and decisions made in agency adjudications. It also can
occur through more subtle means, such as early agenda formulation,
decisions regarding enforcement prioritization, and other forms of
priority setting.51
The opportunity for executive branch policymaking accompanies
almost any federal statute, including those that implicate elections.
This broad scope, however, should not be mistaken for a lack of legal
limits. To the contrary, the executive branch’s policymaking powers are
constrained by the same legal rules that empower the executive branch
in the first place.52 This arrangement nevertheless permits officials in
the executive branch, to a limited but significant degree, to advance
preferred policies in the field of elections.53
Despite its importance, only a handful of scholars have explored
this role that the federal executive plays in election administration.
This body of work includes insightful scholarship by Jennifer Nou and
Daniel Tokaji.54 It also includes a much larger body of work that at least
touches on these issues as they relate to broader questions of
institutionalism, including with respect to the administrative
51. See infra note 100 (defining “priority setting”); see also Cary Coglianese & Daniel E.
Walters, Agenda-Setting in the Regulatory State: Theory and Evidence, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 93, 97
(2016) (defining early agenda-setting as “the choices and opportunities that both agency officials
and other participants in the regulatory process” face regarding what problems to emphasize and
alternatives to consider); Andrias, supra note 4, at 1034 (“Though it has received little scholarly
attention, presidential influence over agency enforcement activity has been a primary mechanism
for effecting national regulatory policy. Nonenforcement in particular, which is subject to few
judicial checks, has proved to be an important tool for advancing the presidential agenda.”).
52. See generally MANHEIM & WATTS, supra note 14, at 37–38 (discussing this phenomenon
and its legal limits).
53. See Mashaw, supra note 1, at 96 (“If congressional statutes were truly specific with
respect to the actions that administrators were to take, presidential politics would be a mere
beauty contest.”); see also MANHEIM & WATTS, supra note 14, at 37–54 (discussing ways in which
the law empowers executive branch actors to engage in policymaking).
54. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, Beyond Repair: FEC Reform and Deadlock Deference, in
DEMOCRACY BY THE PEOPLE: REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA 173 (Eugene D. Mazo &
Timothy K. Kuhner eds., 2018) (discussing the role of the FEC in electoral regulation); Nou, supra
note 44 (offering critiques of the Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”) and explaining how this
analysis informs federal election administration more broadly); see also Note, A Federal
Administrative Approach to Redistricting Reform, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1842, 1843–44 (2008)
(advocating for the creation of an independent federal agency to oversee congressional redistricting
plans). This body of literature also includes a survey commissioned by the Congressional Research
Service. See GARRETT, supra note 21. Tellingly, the analysis contained in this survey—which seeks
to describe “Federal Government Roles” in elections (and, as such, includes sections dedicated to
“Congress,” “Federal Agencies,” and the “Federal Judiciary”)—nowhere explains the role, if any,
played by the president.
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preclearance procedure associated with the VRA.55 It is rare to find
scholarship discussing the role that the federal executive branch plays
more broadly. Almost completely absent (that is, outside the area of
VRA administrative preclearance) is any discussion of the role that the
president, in particular, plays in election administration.56
To provide a framework for these discussions, the remainder of
this Section provides a general overview of the involvement of the
federal executive branch in election law. This overview is organized by
the empowered actor (that is, by the actor formally empowered by law
to exercise the relevant authority): (i) an executive agency; (ii) an
independent agency; or (iii) the president herself. This organizational
breakdown will prove helpful when identifying how the president draws
on these myriad grants of power to influence elections.
1. Power Running to Executive Agencies
Congress has directed a range of election-related powers toward
executive agencies, which are characterized by leadership subject to atwill removal by the president. 57 Perhaps the most important executive
agency for purposes of election administration is DOJ, which helps to
execute the VRA and other election-related statutes, such as the NVRA
and the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”).58 Until recently, DOJ played
55. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance,
49 HOW. L.J. 785, 832–35 (2006) (discussing how preclearance decisions at DOJ are subject to
partisan manipulation); Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The
Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44 IND. L. REV. 113 (2010) (advocating for stronger private
enforcement regimes for federal election statutes); Samuel Issacharoff, Comment, Beyond the
Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 121–23 (2013) (proposing a disclosure
model that might be more effective than the VRA’s preclearance regime); Daniel P. Tokaji, The
Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 135 (2009)
[hereinafter Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform] (exploring the ineffectiveness of the EAC);
Zipkin, supra note 20 (arguing that administrative law presents doctrinal resources for bolstering
democratic legitimacy in the electoral process); Heather K. Gerken, Essay, A Third Way for the
Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 748 (2006)
(proposing judicial review of section 5 preclearance grants in accordance with administrative
law principles).
56. An exception comes in the scholarship of Jennifer Nou, who includes a discussion of the
president in a work exploring pathologies in the EAC and explaining how the analysis sheds light
on other federal agencies involved in election administration. Nou, supra note 44, at 178–79. Nou’s
discussion echoes some of the themes and concerns explored in this Article.
57. See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and
the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 462–65 (2008) (defining independent
agencies, in contrast to executive agencies). But see Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz,
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013)
(questioning the helpfulness of these categories and instead proposing that commentators identify
relevant traits).
58. See National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77; Help
America Vote Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666. In addition, DOJ administers the
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (1986),
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a particularly consequential role in helping to police preclearance
associated with section 5 of the VRA.59 Within DOJ, it is the Civil Rights
Division, and in particular the Voting Section, that engages in this civil
enforcement work.60 In addition, DOJ wields prosecutorial power in
response to violations of the criminal code, including with respect to
election-related crimes such as voter fraud and voter intimidation.61
The Department of Commerce also executes mandates that
deeply affect elections. Housed within this agency is the Census
Bureau, which is responsible for gathering the data that are used for
congressional apportionment, as well as for redistricting within
states.62 In addition, the Department of Commerce houses the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, which provides election-related
technical assistance to other agencies involved in elections.
Recently, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) also
became integrally involved in elections. As discussed above, in 2017, the
Secretary of Homeland Security designated election infrastructure as
“critical.” This infrastructure includes physical locations—such as
storage facilities, polling places, and centralized vote tabulation
locations—as well as physical items such as voting machines. It also
includes intangible items such as information and communications
technology.63 Pursuant to statutes enacted in the wake of the terrorist
attacks of 2001,64 this designation tasks DHS, as the “sector-specific
agenc[y]” to which election infrastructure has been assigned, with
coordinating collaborative efforts to help protect this infrastructure.65
and the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 98-435, 98 Stat.
1678 (1984), as well as a number of criminal statutes that implicate elections.
59. This ended in 2013, when the Supreme Court functionally invalidated the section 5
preclearance mechanism. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (holding section 4 of
the VRA, which set forth the coverage formula for the preclearance requirement, unconstitutional).
60. See C.R. Div., Statutes Enforced, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/
page/file/962196/download (last visited Dec. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/R2G5-JHAA].
61. See GARRETT, supra note 21, at 12–14.
62. See JENNIFER D. WILLIAMS, CONG. RSCH. SERV, R44788, THE DECENNIAL CENSUS: ISSUES
FOR 2020, at 1 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44788.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J55-6MBT].
63. See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PROGRESS MADE, BUT
ADDITIONAL EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO SECURE THE ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE 11 (2019),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-03/OIG-19-24-Feb19.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CW6P-WV3D].
64. See, e.g., Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 5195c.
65. See BRIAN E. HUMPHREYS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10677, THE DESIGNATION OF ELECTION
SYSTEMS AS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10677.pdf (last updated
Sept. 18, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9GTN-H6S7]; Election Security, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/election-security (last updated July 14, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JCX278SX] (“[To secure election infrastructure,] DHS collaborates with federal departments and
agencies, state and local government, election officials, and other valued partners . . . .”). It does
not, however, empower DHS to exercise regulatory authority associated with election
infrastructure. HUMPHREYS, supra.
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The agency within DHS that is primarily responsible for this work is
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.66
A number of other executive agencies also exercise limited forms
of authority over elections. The Treasury Department oversees the
public financing of presidential candidates and, through the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”), executes the Internal Revenue Code, which
governs political activities of certain tax-exempt organizations.67 The
Department of Defense administers rules associated with military and
overseas voters.68 The Department of State engages in work responsive
to the threat of foreign interference in elections.69 The Federal
Communications Commission plays a minor role relating to
broadcast access time for candidates.70 The list goes on, with the
remaining agencies tending to exercise incidental or nominal power
over elections.71
2. Power Running to Independent Agencies
Independent agencies exist outside the control of the cabinet
agencies as well as the Executive Office of the President, and their
leadership is not subject to at-will removal by the president.72 This legal
structure is intended to insulate the agencies from presidential
control.73 Congress has vested significant election-related power in
independent agencies. The two most important are the FEC and the
Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”). The FEC is responsible for
execution of the federal government’s campaign finance laws. It has

66, See About CISA, CYBERSEC. & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, https://www.cisa.gov/
about-cisa (last visited Dec. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/S9JA-4PV2]; see also Election
Infrastructure Security, CYBERSEC. & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, https://www.cisa.gov/
election-security (last visited Dec. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/35PP-ZN8A].
67. GARRETT, supra note 21, at 18, 23–24.
68. Nou, supra note 44, at 151.
69. GARRETT, supra note 21, at 23. Almost any agency has powers incidentally touching on
elections. An agency charged with administering wage laws, for example, might encounter a
dispute over campaign workers. The Hatch Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147, which
prohibits employees from engaging in certain kinds of political campaign activities, applies broadly
across many agencies. A somewhat whimsical example of incidental election-law authority
emerges from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, which facilitates voting from
space. GARRETT, supra note 21, at 2 n.7. None of these agencies, however, exercise the same
concentrated and potential consequential grants of election-related power as DOJ, the Commerce
Department, and others discussed above.
70. GARRETT, supra note 21, at 24.
71. See id. at app. (table outlining the roles agencies play in elections).
72. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 57, at 462 (defining independent agencies).
73. See id. at 459–61 (concluding that, while “statutory limits on the President’s appointment
and removal powers are effective” at ensuring a president cannot appoint a commission full of
loyalists, the independence of agencies nevertheless is compromised by party politicization).
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rulemaking power as part of this charge.74 It also provides compliance
guidance, and it is responsible for civil enforcement proceedings.
The EAC was created in 2002 in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore.75
Congress charged it with assisting states with election administration.
It plays a particularly important role in executing parts of HAVA.76 It
also performs some auditing, accreditation, and certification functions
for voting systems and federal fund distribution. While the EAC
generally is prohibited from engaging in rulemaking, it does have
regulatory authority associated with federal voter registration forms.77
In addition to the FEC and EAC, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
investigates and reports on various forms of discrimination, including
with respect to voting.
Outside of these agencies, the election-related powers running
to independent agencies tend to be incidental or indirect. Still, the
powers are at times significant. The United States Postal Service
(“USPS”), for example, is an independent agency that provides mail
processing and delivery services. It plays no direct role in regulating
elections. It nevertheless provides a service so integral to modern
election administration that the service itself, in a sense, constitutes a
form of election administration: the delivery of absentee ballots and
other election-related mail.78 Some of the USPS’s work in this area is
coterminous with the USPS’s other mail-delivery services. (For
example, the USPS makes stamps, which can be used to mail ballots or
any other form of mail.) But some of the USPS’s work in this area is
specially directed at elections. For example, the USPS designates some
of its staff as “election mail coordinators” who help to coordinate with
state and local election officials as they work to administer elections.
The USPS also has special designations that jurisdictions can use for
ballots as well as for other forms of election mail, and it has adopted
policies that, in limited ways, prioritize election mail.79 As the USPS

74. GARRETT, supra note 21, at 20.
75. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
76. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as amended
at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901-21145).
77. See 52 U.S.C. § 20508; see also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 5
(2013) (“The Election Assistance Commission is invested with rulemaking authority to prescribe
the contents of that Federal Form.”).
78. See Letter from Thomas J. Marshall, Gen. Couns. & Exec. Vice President, U.S. Postal
Serv., to Election Officials (May 29, 2020), https://about.usps.com/newsroom/national-releases/
2020/2020-05-29-marshall-to-election-officials-re-election-mail.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GEK9EQ5K] (describing USPS’s requirements and services in the context of election-related mail).
79. Id.; see also Washington v. Trump, No. 1:20-CV-03127-SAB, 2020 WL 5568557, at *1–2
(E.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2020) (describing USPS policy of treating election mail as first class mail
regardless of the paid class of service).

404

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2:385

example helps to confirm, election-related administration can reach
across agencies in subtle ways.80
As noted above, for three independent agencies—the FEC, the
EAC, and, to a lesser but still important extent, the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights—election-related work remains central to their
missions. To this end, it is noteworthy that Congress has designed all
three with an unusual leadership structure. Each has a multimembered
commission with a requirement of bipartisanship. Alone, these qualities
are not unusual for an independent agency. What is unusual, however,
is that each commission is even-numbered. Especially when evenly split
by party, an even-numbered leadership team can be particularly prone
to deadlock.
3. Power Running Directly to the President
Congress, finally, has vested some election-related authority
directly in the president. The president, in other words, enjoys some
election-related powers that she can exercise unilaterally. She can do
so through legally binding orders—orders that carry the force and effect
of law.81
The list of these powers is short, and many involve generally
applicable powers that implicate elections only in particular
circumstances. The president can, for example, impose sanctions in
response to “any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” 82
This threat might include foreign interference in U.S. elections—as
reflected in presidents’ recent executive orders.83 Congress has also
facilitated presidents’ ability to create advisory commissions, including

80. Congress, of course, can take steps to counteract such intrusions. An agency that plays a
lesser role than the law might otherwise allow is the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”). Congress has barred the SEC, through appropriations bills, from spending money
associated with required disclosure of political contributions. See, e.g., Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 707, 129 Stat. 2242, 3029–30 (2015); see also
Jacob Rund, Senate Democrats Press GOP to Scrap Political Spending Disclosure Ban, CQ ROLL
CALL (Sept. 15, 2016), https://today.westlaw.com/Document/I58c7f9ae7b7c11e698dc8b09b4f043e0
/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0
[https://perma.cc/7YUA-658R].
81. See Lisa Manheim & Kathryn A. Watts, Reviewing Presidential Orders, 86 U. CHI. L. REV.
1743, 1764–65 (2019).
82. International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 § 202(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
83. See, e.g., Ed Stein, What’s in the Executive Order on Election Interference?, LAWFARE
(Sept. 19, 2018, 11:26 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whats-executive-order-electioninterference [https://perma.cc/JEP4-NDXQ] (discussing a 2018 executive order addressing
sanctions for foreign interference in U.S. elections).
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toward election-related ends.84 For illustrations of the latter, consider
the election-related commission set up by President Obama, and then,
four years later, the election-related commission set up by President
Trump.85 Occasionally, a grant of power more narrowly affecting
election administration runs directly to the president. One of the rare
examples comes via statutes governing the Census. In at least one
notable respect, these census-related statutes empower the president,
acting alone, to influence the rules governing elections in a technical
but potentially consequential manner.86 Outside the field of election
law, Congress often permits more power to run unilaterally to the
president.87 This contrast may reflect congressional concerns over
presidents exercising untrammeled control over matters relating
to elections.88
In sum, Congress has empowered the federal executive branch
to play a nuanced but important role in setting the policies that help to
dictate how elections are run in the United States. This dynamic
provides insight into the topic that this Article now seeks to explore: the
role that the president herself plays in how election rules are
interpreted and implemented.
II. PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF ELECTIONS
Using the legal power of his office, the President of the United
States routinely exercises control over elections. These forms of control
often are subtle and indirect. Presidential control over elections
nevertheless is a pervasive phenomenon, reaching into races across the
country, and it has potentially meaningful effects on election outcomes.
The result is concerning: a sitting president exercising control over the
very same elections that are intended to justify, and check, his
continuing authority. This Part explores the phenomenon. It begins by
analyzing how presidents control election rules by exercising their legal
authority in various ways. This Part then turns to the question of why
presidential control of elections, in some form, may be inevitable. It also

84. See Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51 (1994).
85. Exec. Order No. 13,799, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,389 (May 11, 2017) (Trump); Exec. Order No.
13,639, 70 Fed. Reg. 19,979 (Apr. 3, 2013) (Obama).
86. See infra notes 228–238 and accompanying text (unpacking this grant of power and
explaining how it affects election administration).
87. See Manheim & Watts, supra note 81, at 1764–65, 1771 (discussing presidential orders
that are “legally binding”); see also infra note 208 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 239–243 and accompanying text (noting limited constraints on presidents
exercising unilateral power).
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asks whether, in the near future, the phenomenon may be poised to
expand in significant ways.
Before jumping into the analysis, it is important to explain
briefly how, exactly, a president is able to influence executive branch
policymaking. As is well known in administrative law circles, the
answer depends on how Congress structured the grant of power. When
Congress’s delegation runs to an executive agency, the president can
employ a range of law-based tools to exercise control. One of the most
important tools comes in the form of nomination decisions, as the
president exercises his constitutionally protected power to select the
leaders of these agencies.89 The president also enjoys the ability to
remove, at will, high-ranking officials.90 In addition, presidents have
insisted that many of these executive agencies’ actions be subject to
White House review,91 and, on occasion, will formally issue additional
directives to executive agency officials to exert further influence.92 Less
formal forms of centralized review also help presidents to consolidate
power over executive agencies.93 Although, as a matter of custom,

89. The Constitution protects the president’s ability to nominate principal officers, subject to
confirmation by the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 125 (1976) (addressing the appointment process). Though Congress has somewhat more
flexibility with respect to the rules governing the appointment of inferior officers, see U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2, the president still tends to play an important role. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S.
Ct. 2044 (2018) (holding that appointment of administrative law judges by SEC staff violated the
Appointments Clause). It is correct that the Senate often serves as a countervailing check with
respect to presidential nominations. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (allowing the president to
appoint principal officers “by and with the Advice and Consent” of the Senate). But that check is
not as effective as one might assume given presidents’ increasingly common reliance on temporary
leaders—that is, “Actings”—who have not received Senate confirmation. See Anne Joseph
O’Connell, Actings, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 613, 617–25 (2020).
90. See, e.g., Seila L., LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020)
(holding unconstitutional for-cause restrictions on the president’s authority to remove the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s director); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight
Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) (holding unconstitutional dual for-cause limitations on removal of
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s members).
91. The Trump Administration has taken additional actions in an attempt to increase formal
White House oversight of rulemaking. These include changes at the Treasury Department, which
houses the Internal Revenue Service. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury,
OMB Update Tax Regulatory Review Process (Apr. 12, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/news/
press-releases/sm0345 [https://perma.cc/LG93-95K5].
92. Typically, these directives (often labeled an “Executive Order” or “Presidential
Memorandum”) are not legally binding. Nevertheless, they tend to achieve their desired ends:
subordinates normally spring into action. This pattern of compliance presumably reflects norms,
the threat of removal, or some combination thereof. See Tara Leigh Grove, Presidential Laws and
the Missing Interpretative Theory, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 877, 925–29 (2020) (describing the role that
the presidents’ subordinates play in drafting executive orders); see also Manheim & Watts, supra
note 81, at 1765–66 (noting that, because of the threat of removal, executive orders have a strong
influence on agency heads even if the orders are not legally binding).
93. See generally, e.g., Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 99 (examining the ways in
which the White House sets regulatory policy, using the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
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presidents historically have exercised less influence over some
executive agencies—such as DOJ and the IRS—these norms are not
law. Moreover, they may be breaking down.94
When a congressional grant of authority runs to an independent
agency, by contrast, the president’s toolbox is much more limited. Job
protection helps to explain this limitation in the president’s powers.
Once a head of an independent agency is nominated by the president
and confirmed by the Senate, she enjoys legal safeguards against
removal. As a result, the president has relatively few law-based means
by which to exercise control over that leader’s decisionmaking.95 Still,
in addition to whatever informal means the president might use to
influence an independent agency’s decisions, he also retains significant
policymaking influence through the initial nomination decision.96
The final form of authority is a direct grant of power running to
the president. When Congress (or the Constitution) has conferred such
authority on the president, rather than an agency, the president can
exercise this power all on his own. While many of the legal rules
governing these unilateral presidential actions are unsettled, 97 wellestablished case law confirms that, at a minimum, the president must

as a case study); id. at 49–50, 54–55 (evaluating the “presidential control” model of understanding
administrative law).
94. See Renan, supra note 21, at 2189–94.
95. Presidents nevertheless have tried to exercise some additional forms of control. While
independent agencies’ rules historically have not been subject to review by the Office of
Management and Budget (“OMB”) or the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”),
for example, Executive Order 12,866 indicated that independent agencies should submit their
“regulatory plans” for this form of review. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Oct. 4, 1993).
In addition, the OMB under President Trump issued an order purporting to increase OIRA review
of major actions taken by independent agencies. See Bridget C.E. Dooling, OMB’s “Major” Move
on Regs & Guidance, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/ombs-major-move-on-regs-guidance/ [https://perma.cc/8R9F-G6CW];
Hal S. Scott, OMB’s Guidance Memorandum to Independent Agencies, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 26, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/26/ombs-guidancememorandum-to-independent-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/X4MK-LHTH].
96. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 57, at 491 (concluding that political polarization may help
the president exercise control over independent agencies once he has appointed a majority of
commissioners from his own party); Datla & Revesz, supra note 57, at 819–24 (noting that the
president can appoint a chair of a multimember agency when there is a vacancy, which are
relatively frequent); see also supra note 89 (discussing presidential appointments).
97. A relatively well-established set of legal rules (including, often, those contained in the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)) governs actions taken by agency officials. But when a
president takes an action, the same set of rules does not apply and the form of judicial review is
different. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Constraining the Statutory President, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 63,
64–70 (2020) (noting that when a president acts pursuant to statutory authority, he is subject to a
different standard of judicial review than an agency); Manheim & Watts, supra note 81, at 1769–
74 (discussing the unsettled nature of judicial review for presidential orders).
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act on the basis of some legal authority and cannot violate either
constitutional or statutory restrictions.98
In the world of administrative law, these sorts of policymaking
tools—tools that allow the president to exercise control over executive
branch decisionmaking—are well known and well studied. Debates over
their nature and legality nevertheless continue to evolve; so do the
practices themselves.99 It is in this context that this Part explores a
phenomenon that, despite its troubling pervasiveness and normative
implications, has largely escaped scholarly attention: how presidents
use these tools to influence the administration of elections.
A. Executive Agencies: Control Through Priority Setting
Much of the federal government’s control over election
administration runs through executive agencies. As explained in Part
I, these grants of power include those associated with the VRA and
other landmark voting-rights statutes. It also includes grants of power
associated with the administration of the Census, as well as the
taxation of political entities, the protection of election infrastructure,
and the coordination of election-related activities. The use of executive
agencies to administer these election-related mandates presents the
president with a tempting opportunity: the chance to leverage his
considerable control over agency leaders in a way that might push
election rules in her favor.
This Section explores how, exactly, presidents influence election
administration when they seek to control elections through executive
agencies. It does so by identifying several examples across agencies
that, together, illustrate the overarching pattern in this context:
namely, that presidents tend to exercise such control by influencing
agencies’ priority setting.100 This reliance on priority setting tracks
98. See Manheim & Watts, supra note 81, at 1774–81 (describing the limited legal precedents
for judicial review of presidential orders); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952) (“The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself.”); id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (establishing a
three-tier framework for analyzing presidential acts).
99. The basic history also is well known. Viewed as an overarching trend, presidential
influence over agencies—executive as well as independent—appears to have become more
aggressive over the last few decades, with today’s presidents openly seeking to exercise control
over executive branch policymaking. See Manheim & Watts, supra note 81, at 1763–69 (describing
presidential reliance on executive orders to exercise control over agency policy); see also Kathryn
E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitary Executive, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 515,
559–61 (2018); Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 550 (2005). This
more aggressive approach can be traced back to the presidency of Ronald Reagan, with important
foundations also set by Bill Clinton. See Kovacs, supra, at 559–61.
100. By “priority setting,” this Article means to refer to top-down decisions regarding which
mandates an agency will prioritize and which it will deprioritize. This category includes decisions
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congressional design and, more specifically, the limited nature of
Congress’s delegations in this area. After describing this pattern, this
Section complicates its observations by identifying ways in which
presidents may be attempting to expand their control over executive
agencies. This Section then explains how presidential control of
executive agencies, in the context of election administration, might
affect election outcomes. Finally, it concludes with a brief discussion of
what checks, if any, may exist to temper these forms of control.
Turning first to how, exactly, presidents exercise control in the
context of executive agencies, a particularly vivid example emerged
recently from DHS. In January 2017, the outgoing DHS Secretary (an
Obama appointee) officially designated election infrastructure as
“critical.”101 This designation triggered a range of obligations,102 which
the Secretary triggered for the purpose of ensuring that, at DHS,
election infrastructure would be, “on a more formal and enduring
basis, . . . a priority for cybersecurity assistance and protections.”103
Well into the subsequent administration, however, DHS had
fallen drastically behind where its mandates required it to be. 104 The
agency had not so much as started much of the relevant work, including

regarding enforcement policies as well as, at an extreme, individual enforcement actions. For a
sophisticated analysis of agency enforcement practices and how presidents influence them, see
Andrias, supra note 4, at 1042 (explaining that the president’s enforcement powers include
“shaping regulatory outcomes through decisions about enforcement policy and through attention
to problems of regulatory compliance” and providing details on what this activity looks like). See
also supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing “priority setting” and presidential influence
over agency enforcement activity).
101. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the
Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector (Jan. 6, 2017), https://
www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement-secretary-johnson-designation-election-infrastructurecritical [https://perma.cc/7EAY-BSMP]; see also Mark Landler & David E. Sanger, Obama Says He
Told Putin: ‘Cut It Out’ on Hacking, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/12/16/us/politics/obama-putin-hacking-news-conference.html [https://perma.cc/7UV7-8UT8]
(describing President Obama’s approach for addressing foreign interference).
102. DHS’s new responsibilities included coordinating information sharing among federal,
state, and local governments and outside stakeholders; providing specialized expertise and other
services to these same groups; and, more generally, serving as the “the primary federal interface”
with respect to election security. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-267, DHS PLANS ARE
URGENTLY NEEDED TO ADDRESS IDENTIFIED CHALLENGES BEFORE THE 2020 ELECTIONS 12
(2020), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=834127 [https://perma.cc/X69D-PV57]. At present, the
DHS subagency responsible for this work is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.
See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (providing background on this agency).
103. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 101.
104. In 2019, for example, an outside audit commissioned by DHS criticized the agency’s
inadequate staffing, lack of initiative, and deficient election-security operations during the
November 2018 midterm elections. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 102, at 25–30.
See generally supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing these deficiencies).
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with respect to basic planning documents, and this inertia held even as
threats to election security continued to mount.105
The sluggishness was by design. After DHS’s January 2017
designation, a newly inaugurated President Trump announced his
resistance to this brand of security work.106 On this point, Trump
diverged from his own DHS appointees, who shared the outgoing
Secretary’s commitment to election security.107 Nevertheless, Trump
preferred a moribund implementation of DHS’s obligations to protect
election infrastructure—in part to bolster the “legitimacy” of his 2016
election victory and, in part, in anticipation of his 2020 presidential
reelection campaign. As a direct response to the President’s preference,
the White House insisted that DHS focus its energies elsewhere. Chief
of Staff Mick Mulvaney, for example, told the DHS Secretary not to
raise the issue with the President. The Secretary—and
agency—complied.108
At DHS, the role played by presidential pressure was clear.
Rarely, however, is presidential involvement in election-related
administration quite so obvious (at least, to the public).109
Investigations into other executive agencies nevertheless reveal a
similar pattern.
To this end, perhaps the most important federal agency
responsible for election-related administration is DOJ. Beginning with
the VRA, Congress has charged this agency with some of the federal
government’s most sweeping and consequential electoral mandates.
DOJ’s docket now includes protection of voting rights pursuant to the
105. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 63, at 7
(“[D]espite Federal requirements, DHS has not completed the plans and strategies critical to
identifying emerging threats and mitigation activities, or established metrics to measure progress
in securing the election infrastructure.”).
106. Eric Schmitt, David E. Sanger & Maggie Haberman, In Push for 2020 Election Security,
Top Official Was Warned: Don’t Tell Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/24/us/politics/russia-2020-election-trump.html [https://perma.cc/5PDR-ZPDV].
107. See, e.g., Morgan Chalfant, Trump Official: Election Infrastructure Should Be Protected,
HILL (Feb. 7, 2017, 2:16 PM EST), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/318320-trump-officialelection-infrastructure-should-be-protected [https://perma.cc/2VHG-JAH2]; see also Schmitt et al.,
supra note 106 (describing desire within DHS’s leadership to prioritize election security).
108. See Schmitt et al., supra note 106.
109. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 62 (2013)
(discussing the White House’s “lack of transparency” when it seeks to control agency action);
Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 82 (concluding, through its empirical study of the EPA,
that “White House involvement” is seldom transparent to the public); Heidi Kitrosser, The
Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1755 (2009) (discussing the possibility of a president
“secretly [steering agency] decisions” while publicly distancing himself from them); Nina A.
Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127,
1159 (2010) ([“The presidential] supervision process is largely opaque.”); see also infra notes 146–
154 (discussing recent efforts by the Census Department to obfuscate White House involvement
in its decisionmaking).
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VRA, regulation of voter registration pursuant to the NVRA and HAVA,
prosecution of election-related crimes, and more.110
Faced with such responsibility, DOJ has fielded a steady stream
of accusations regarding whether political influence has affected its
implementation of election-related mandates. In 2005, for example, the
New York Times published an editorial lambasting what it construed as
DOJ’s partisan enforcement of the VRA. The paper went so far as to
suggest that President Bush was using his “powers” to “rig the election
process.”111 This rhetoric was inflammatory. On the substance,
however, the claims are familiar. Similar allegations of partisanship
affecting election administration in the Bush-era DOJ routinely appear
in the scholarly literature.112
Further allegations emerged under Obama. In 2009, for
example, Republican members of Congress accused the Obama-era DOJ
of administering election-related criminal laws in a partisan manner to
protect “political all[ies].”113 In response to these allegations, DOJ Office
of the Inspector General conducted an investigation into the alleged
politicization of the Voting Section of DOJ’s Civil Rights Division and,
in 2013, issued a lengthy report.114 According to this report, a moderate
degree of politicization had indeed affected the agency in its
implementation of voting rights laws. On the one hand, the Inspector
General could not identify adequate evidence to conclude that Division
leadership had exercised “improper” political influence over how DOJ
was enforcing these laws.115 On the other hand, the investigators did
express “concerns about particular decisions in a few cases”;
acknowledged “changes in enforcement priorities over time”; and

110. See Statutes Enforced by the Voting Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
crt/statutes-enforced-voting-section (last updated Sept. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/XKB8-PW6R].
111. Editorial, Fixing the Game, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/
12/05/opinion/fixing-the-game.html [https://perma.cc/H4YC-PC7W].
112. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, The Bush Administration and Civil Rights: Lessons Learned, 4
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 77 (2009) (“The record of the Bush Administration reveals a
shift away from traditional enforcement priorities and, more significantly, a worrisome erosion of
institutional norms of impartiality, professionalism, and nonpartisanship in civil rights
enforcement.”); see also id. at 79 (discussing section 2 of the VRA); Pamela S. Karlan, Lessons
Learned: Voting Rights and the Bush Administration, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 19
(2009) (“[W]e saw an administration transform the Department of Justice, and particularly the
Civil Rights Division’s Voting Section, from a nonpartisan protector of voting rights into a
political actor.”).
113. Charlie Savage, Report Examines Civil Rights During Bush Years, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
2, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/us/politics/03rights.html [https://perma.cc/C2GBEDEK].
114. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A REVIEW OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE
VOTING SECTION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION (2013), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2013/
s1303.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5AS-HXJX].
115. Id. at 251.
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lamented “deep ideological polarization fuel[ing] disputes and mistrust
that [has] harmed the functioning of the Voting Section.”116
Since the issuance of this 2013 report and subsequent
inauguration of President Trump, allegations of politicization at DOJ
only have intensified—including with respect to its implementation of
election laws.117 Among the most troubling developments, prior to the
2020 elections, were signs of White House pressure regarding which
individual criminal prosecutions DOJ should pursue, including with
respect to election-related crimes; allegations of politically motivated,
retaliatory investigations of DOJ personnel previously charged with
investigating election-related criminal activity; and the threatened
deployment of federal agents (including some in DOJ) to polling places
allegedly for the purpose of monitoring voter fraud.118 In the aftermath
of the 2020 elections, President Trump allegedly kept up his
interference with DOJ’s election-related decisionmaking.119
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Michael Wines, Voting Rights Advocates Used to Have an Ally in the Government.
That’s Changing., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/12/us/votingrights-voter-id-suppression.html [https://perma.cc/QKQ4-BB4T] (comparing the work of DOJ
under the Trump Administration to that of prior administrations). Cf. infra notes 132–134 and
accompanying text (discussing potential for presidential politicization at the IRS); R. Robin
McDonald, Sally Yates: White House Has Violated ‘Important Norms,’ LAW.COM: DAILY REP. (Oct.
13, 2017), https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/sites/dailyreportonline/2017/10/13/sally-yateswhite-house-has-violated-important-norms/ [https://perma.cc/QME9-ZVCB] (quoting former
Acting Attorney General Sally Yates as claiming that, under the Trump Administration, “[t]he
wall between the Department of Justice and the White House” has been breached).
118. See, e.g., @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Sept. 3, 2018, 1:25 PM), https://mobile.
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1036681588573130752
[https://perma.cc/6PCG-4G9C]
(criticizing DOJ for proceeding against two sitting Republican congressmen because of potential
electoral ramifications); Katie Benner & Adam Goldman, Justice Dept. Is Said to Open Criminal
Inquiry into Its Own Russia Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/10/24/us/politics/john-durham-criminal-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/U54X-GDGV];
Maggie Haberman & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Gives Attorney General Sweeping Power in
Review of 2016 Campaign Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/05/23/us/politics/trump-barr-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/YP76-U3SY]; Memorandum
on Agency Cooperation with Attorney General’s Review of Intelligence Activities Relating to the
2016 Presidential Campaigns, 84 Fed. Reg. 24,971 (May 23, 2019); Kathleen Gray, On Fox News,
the President Floats Sending Law Enforcement Officials to the Polls, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/21/us/elections/on-fox-news-the-president-floats-sending-lawenforcement-officials-to-the-polls.html [https://perma.cc/JBL4-MMFX].
119. See, e.g., Jess Bravin & Sadie Gurman, Trump Pressed Justice Department to Go Directly
to Supreme Court to Overturn Election Results, WALL ST. J. (Jan 24, 2021, 11:07 PM ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-pressed-to-change-justice-department-leadership-to-boosthis-voter-fraud-claims-11611434369 [https://perma.cc/L674-RLHV]; Katie Benner, The Justice
Dept.’s Inspector General Opens an Investigation into Any Efforts to Overturn the Election., N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/25/us/politics/justice-dept-investigationelection-trump.html [https://perma.cc/Q3EV-S9R2]; see also Katie Benner & Charlie Savage,
Jeffrey Clark Was Considered Unassuming. Then He Plotted With Trump., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/24/us/politics/jeffrey-clark-trump-election.html [https://
perma.cc/Q8CW-3THZ] (recounting allegations that the Acting Head of the Justice Department’s
Civil Division was “plot[ting] with the president to wield the department’s power to try to alter the
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Allegations of politicization, of course, are not conclusive
evidence of politicization. And the existence of politicization at an
executive agency does not necessarily implicate a sitting president.
Nevertheless, the patterns that have emerged over time at DOJ suggest
that recent presidents indeed have put a thumb on the scale. More
specifically, these patterns suggest that White House involvement—at
a minimum, through nomination decisions and, particularly in recent
years, through what appears to be behind-the-scenes pressure from the
White House—indeed has affected DOJ’s administration of election
mandates, primarily through how the agency sets its priorities.
A closer look at DOJ’s administration of the NVRA—as
discussed briefly in this Article’s introduction—helps to demonstrate.
Under different presidential administrations, DOJ not only has altered
how it prioritizes enforcement of the NVRA; it has done so in ways that
generally appear to track the electoral interests of the political party
occupying the White House. More specifically, when deciding which
registration-related claims to prioritize and pursue, administrations led
by Republicans have tended to prioritize enforcement of NVRA
mandates that require states to cull voter registration rolls.120
Administrations led by Democrats, by contrast, have tended to
prioritize enforcement of NVRA mandates that require jurisdictions to
retain eligible voters on the rolls.121 According to the conventional
wisdom, at least, this shift in enforcement prioritization predictably
favors the electoral prospects of one political party over the other.122
Georgia election outcome”). It is worth noting that it is not clear how, if at all, DOJ could have
possibly affected the outcome of the 2020 elections at that point. See generally Manheim, supra
note 31.
120. One striking example came when, citing the recent “change in Administrations,” the
Trump-era DOJ reversed its longstanding interpretation of section 8 of the NVRA in a filing before
the Supreme Court. Brief for Respondents at 19 n.11, Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S.
Ct. 1833 (2018) (No. 16-980), 2017 WL 4161967, at *19 n.11; see also Michael T. Morley,
Republicans and the Voting Rights Act, 54 TULSA L. REV. 281, 291 (2019) (reviewing JESSE H.
RHODES, BALLOT BLOCKED: THE POLITICAL EROSION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2017)):
[T]he Bush Justice Department brought several suits to enforce Section 8 of the
National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”), which requires jurisdictions to update voter
registration lists to eliminate outdated records to reduce the possibility of mistake,
double voting, or absentee ballot fraud. Under the Obama Administration, in contrast,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Fernandez announced to Voting Section staff
attorneys she “ ‘did not care about’ or ‘was not interested’ in pursuing Section 8 cases.”
(footnotes omitted); Manheim & Porter, supra note 18, at 220–21 (describing how Republicanaligned actors have cast the NVRA as an “anti-voter-fraud-law”); Wines, supra note 117
(explaining how the Trump-era DOJ could have used the NVRA to pressure states to aggressively
remove names from voting rolls).
121. See sources cited supra note 120 (comparing the Republican and Democratic approaches
to enforcing the NVRA).
122. The conventional wisdom holds, to put it bluntly, that Republican candidates benefit
when the federal government pressures a jurisdiction into removing voters from the rolls, while
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A similar pattern has emerged from DOJ’s administration of the
VRA. The VRA empowers DOJ in a range of ways. It empowers DOJ to
enforce federal protections against race-based discrimination in voting;
to ensure that jurisdictions provide appropriate assistance to voters
who are members of minority language groups; in limited
circumstances, to monitor polling places on election day; and more.123
In recent years, much of this work has centered around section 2, which
prohibits jurisdictions from implementing any election-related law that
“results in a denial or abridgement of the [right to vote] on account of [a
protected classification, such as race.]”124 At times, section 2’s mandate
requires that jurisdictions change their voting systems to allow
minority voters more opportunity to elect representatives of their
choice.125 Stated otherwise, section 2 at times requires jurisdictions to
change their laws in ways that are—by design—likely to lead to
different electoral outcomes.
It is not easy to parse out how, exactly, changes in section 2
enforcement will affect the electoral prospects of various candidates,
particularly when it implicates complicated areas such as redistricting.
What is clear, however, is that a causal relationship does exist between
the practices governed by section 2—practices like redistricting—and
likely election outcomes. (As noted above, this shift in electoral
prospects is in a sense the very point of the provision.) For its part, DOJ
is aware of the opportunity it has to benefit a particular political party
or political candidates, including those allied with the president,
through strategic enforcement of section 2.126 While commentators do
Democratic candidates tend to benefit from the opposite. See Manheim & Porter, supra note 18, at
252–53. Assuming this correlation is correct, when DOJ has decided which NVRA-related
mandates to prioritize, its decisions across several administrations indeed have tracked the
electoral prospects of the president in office and his political allies. See id. at 220–21.
123. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 110 (describing the statutes administered
by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division); see also About Federal Observers and Election
Monitoring, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-federal-observers-and-electionmonitoring (last updated Sept. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3QLX-ZZNG] (addressing DOJ’s
authority to monitor polling places).
124. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). This deprivation occurs whenever members of a protected class
“have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice.” Id. § 10301(b).
125. See id.
126. Strategic enforcement of section 2 can make a significant difference in how jurisdictions
run their elections because state and local governments do not always adhere to section 2’s
requirements. A jurisdiction might, for example, prefer to use a traditional at-large method of
election for its legislative branch, and it might insist on keeping this system even when section 2
requires it to increase minority representation by fundamentally changing its voting structure. In
response, DOJ can bring a lawsuit to force the jurisdiction’s hand. Other recalcitrant jurisdictions,
by contrast, never wind up on the receiving end of an enforcement proceeding by DOJ; instead,
they continue to run elections in ways that violate federal law. (In referring to a jurisdiction
“run[ning] elections in ways that violate federal law,” this Article means to refer to jurisdictions
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not agree on the extent to which DOJ in fact has availed itself of this
opportunity—much less on the degree to which the White House has
affirmatively tried to achieve this result through top-down control—
virtually all commentators have acknowledged the shifting enforcement
priorities across administrations.127 In addition, circumstantial
evidence of top-down partisan influence is strong, particularly under
the Trump Administration.128

whose conduct could be legally actionable, were an enforcement action brought—not to wade into
debates over what, exactly, constitutes a violation of the relevant law.) This dynamic empowers
DOJ—and, by extension, the White House—to set enforcement priorities in strategic ways. It is
true that private litigants might be able to bring section 2 lawsuits to offset some of these strategic
decisions. See Perry Grossman, The Case for State Attorney General Enforcement of the Voting
Rights Act Against Local Governments, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 565, 592–95 (2017) (discussing
section 2 private plaintiffs). Nevertheless, the resources of the federal government help to ensure
that its enforcement-related decisions make a difference.
127. See, e.g., Morley, supra note 120, at 283 (pushing back against conclusion that the Bushera DOJ improperly politicized the VRA, while acknowledging the shifting priorities between
presidential administrations); Karlan, supra note 112, at 19 (explaining how the Voting Section of
DOJ transformed procedurally and substantively during the Bush Administration); Mark A.
Posner, The Real Story Behind the Justice Department’s Implementation of Section 5 of the VRA:
Vigorous Enforcement, as Intended by Congress, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 79, 81–82
(2006); Changing Tides: Exploring the Current State of Civil Rights Enforcement Within the
Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const., C.R. & C.L. of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 117–18 (2007) (testimony of Roger Clegg, President & Gen. Couns.,
Ctr. for Equal Opportunity, on the politicization of hiring in the voting section of DOJ during the
Bush Administration); Charlie Savage, Racial Motive Alleged in a Justice Dept. Decision, N.Y.
TIMES (July 6, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/us/07rights.html [https://perma.cc/
CNM9-GLTV] (describing a “case that has been used as political ammunition against the Obama
administration” in response to portrayals of the Bush Administration as having “politicized” DOJ);
Josh Gerstein, Prosecutor: DOJ Bias Against Whites, POLITICO (Sept. 24, 2010, 10:52 AM EDT),
https://www.politico.com/story/2010/09/prosecutor-doj-bias-against-whites-042676 [https://perma.
cc/ED6J-ZVHC] (discussing testimony from a DOJ prosecutor that the Obama-era DOJ
discouraged prosecutions of minority perpetrators when the alleged victims were white); Mark A.
Posner, The Politicization of Justice Department Decisionmaking Under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act: Is It a Problem and What Should Congress Do?, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 2
(2006), https://web.archive.org/web/20060208041158/http:/www.acslaw.org/files/Section%205%20
decisionmaking%201-30-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5PF-NXMS] (acknowledging concern that
political consideration drove DOJ’s enforcement of section 5); Nou, supra note 44, at 170
(acknowledging the perception that DOJ’s enforcement of the VRA varies depending on the
political party of the administration); Ellen D. Katz, Democrats at DOJ: Why Partisan Use of the
Voting Rights Act Might Not Be So Bad After All, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 415, 418 (2012)
(“Where . . . judicial review is available, my claim is that partisan use of the VRA by DOJ (and,
indeed, other actors) is not the cause for concern it is often made out to be and instead often has
beneficial consequences.”). See generally RHODES, supra note 120.
128. See infra note 129 and accompanying text (providing circumstantial evidence of partisan
influence in the Trump-era DOJ); see also Tierney Sneed, Trump’s DOJ Has Not Filed a Single
New Voting Rights Act Case, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Mar. 5, 2020, 9:32 AM),
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/trumps-doj-has-not-filed-a-single-new-voting-rightsact-case [https://perma.cc/W8FR-53CR] (“The DOJ has not filed a single new Voting Rights Act
case since the Trump administration took over — setting it apart from the last several
administrations, Republican and Democratic.”); Justin Levitt, The Civil Rights Division Bails Out
of Bail-In in Texas, TAKE CARE BLOG (Feb. 8, 2019), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-civil-rightsdivision-bails-out-of-bail-in-in-texas [https://perma.cc/HX95-H5YG] (discussing indicia of strong
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In short, while it remains difficult to draw clear lines between
presidential control, administration of section 2, and the actual effects
on elections, the potential for top-down presidential influence certainly
exists in this area of the law. Moreover, the bulk of the evidence
suggests that presidential control has indeed made a difference in how
DOJ administers its mandates. Particularly in recent years, analogous
patterns have emerged with respect to other election-related
statutes—including criminal statutes—that DOJ is charged
with administering.129
A similar potential for presidential influence exists at the IRS.
Congress has charged this executive agency with administering the tax
laws, including those associated with the tax status of political
organizations. During Obama’s presidency, a high-profile dispute over
enforcement practices emanated from this arrangement. More
specifically, critics aligned with conservative causes began accusing the
IRS of politically motivated treatment of organizations applying for taxexempt status, such as so-called section 501(c)(4) organizations. For
these sorts of entities, tax law interacts with campaign finance rules in
a way that—perhaps unwittingly—puts the IRS in the position of
interpreting and enforcing election-related rules.130
partisan influence in litigation related to section 2); McDonald, supra note 117 (“The wall between
the Department of Justice and the White House has been breached.”).
129. To consider one prominent example, Trump-era federal prosecutors have aggressively
prosecuted alleged voter fraud by non-citizens—“a deliberate choice that demonstrates where the
administration’s priorities stand”—while ignoring more widespread allegations of electoral fraud
involving U.S. citizens aligned with the Republican party. Amy Gardner, Beth Reinhard & Alice
Crites, Trump-Appointed Prosecutor Focused on Allegations of Voting Fraud by Immigrants
amid Warnings About Separate Ballot Scheme, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-appointed-prosecutor-focused-on-allegations-of-votingfraud-by-immigrants-amid-warnings-about-separate-ballot-scheme/2019/02/03/989851c2-19de11e9-8813-cb9dec761e73_story.html [https://perma.cc/MP5P-8UL8]. At an extreme, DOJ has in its
arsenal generally applicable statutes that might be repurposed to deter those who would seek
greater enforcement of other election-related laws, such as laws prohibiting foreign interference
in elections. According to some concerned observers, this extreme scenario describes the 2019
decision of Attorney General William Barr to initiate a criminal probe into earlier, Russia-related
investigations at DOJ. See Benner & Goldman, supra note 118. This decision by Barr—to
criminally investigate the investigators of election crimes—presumably has chilling effects on
enforcement efforts going forward, and it appears to have been taken in direct response to pressure
by President Trump. See, e.g., Peter Stone, Barr’s ‘Investigation of Investigators’ Sparks Fears for
Efforts to Thwart Russia, GUARDIAN (June 16, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/jun/16/william-barr-meller-report-investigation-2020-election [https://perma.cc/U8DNUCZK] (“Attorney general William Barr’s controversial decision to launch a new inquiry into the
origins of the FBI’s 2016 Russia investigation has fueled concerns about the politicization of the
justice department and could hamper attempts to combat Kremlin meddling in the 2020 election,
say ex-top [DOJ] and CIA officials . . . .”).
130. The tax code allows section 501(c)(4) organizations to participate in political campaign
intervention—but only insofar as such activities do not constitute their “primary activity.” Social
Welfare Organizations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/othernon-profits/social-welfare-organizations (last updated Apr. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/VG57-

2021]

PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF ELECTIONS

417

Throughout this long-unfolding IRS scandal, the Obama
Administration denied White House involvement. Yet even it
acknowledged that the IRS had indeed mishandled some of these
matters, including by targeting for additional scrutiny a number of
applications submitted by groups with names that include
conservative-sounding phrases (such as “Tea Party”). While some critics
alleged that President Obama had personally directed the IRS to take
these politically motivated steps,131 defenders of the White House
responded by pointing to a combination of politically neutral challenges
to explain the IRS’s errors and the appearance of impropriety.
Ultimately, an Inspector General’s report indicated that the latter
description was likely a more accurate representation of what occurred.
At no point did persuasive evidence materialize of overt partisan
motivations or of direct White House involvement.132
Still, the controversy took hold of the public imagination,
particularly in conservative media circles.133 And it revealed the
W9Q3]. Among the advantages of holding this status is that, by law, section 501(c)(4) organizations
do not need to disclose donor-related information. See Juliet Eilperin, The Real Reason Outside
Groups Want Tax-Exempt Status, WASH. POST (May 14, 2013, 11:42 AM CDT), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/05/14/why-do-conservative-groups-want-to-betax-exempt-one-word-anonymity/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/ZLB5-E3KL]. This anonymity
can be particularly desirable to donors in the political context, where so-called “dark money” can
have advantages in influencing elections. See Michael Beckel, Nonprofits Outspent Super PACs in
2010, OPENSECRETS (June 18, 2012), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/06/nonprofitsoutspent-super-pacs-in-2/ [https://perma.cc/A99W-GNKV] (“While super PACs were cast as the
big, bad wolves during the last election, the groups were outspent by ‘social welfare’ organizations
by a 3-2 margin, a trend that may continue amid reports that major donors are giving tens of
millions of dollars to the secretive nonprofit groups.”).
131. See, e.g., Colby Itkowitz, Ted Cruz Beats Up on IRS, Obama White House, Comparing It
to Watergate, WASH. POST (July 29, 2015, 3:16 PM CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/powerpost/wp/2015/07/29/ted-cruz-beats-up-on-irs-obama-white-house-comparing-it-towatergate/ [https://perma.cc/A7J3-CCH4].
132. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO
IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW 5–11 (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/
auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMV7-ANUB] (finding problems
with the IRS’s identification criteria, but not for reasons of partisan influence).
133. See, e.g., Monica Langley, Anger at IRS Powers Tea-Party Comeback, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/anger-at-irs-powers-teaparty-comeback-1377657095 (last updated
Aug. 28, 2013, 1:36 AM ET) [https://perma.cc/PL89-T67Q] (describing the Tea Party’s “revival of
interest sparked by controversy over the IRS’s much-publicized targeting of conservative groups”
in 2012); Michael Scherer, New IRS Scandal Echoes a Long History of Political Harassment, TIME
(May 14, 2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/05/14/anger-over-irs-audits-of-conservativesanchored-in-long-history-of-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/55J7-ZMRY] (describing history of IRSrelated controversies). It also conjured memories of another president accused of exploiting the
IRS for political ends: Richard Nixon, whose use of the IRS to help friends and harm political
opponents, including in anticipation of his own reelection efforts, contributed to the flood of
controversies that eventually ended his presidency. David Dykes, Former IRS Chief Recalls
Defying Nixon, USA TODAY (May 26, 2013, 12:06 AM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2013/05/26/irs-chief-defied-nixon/2360951/ [https://perma.cc/RG96-5QEQ]. Of course, what
Nixon did was illegal. The legal lines would be fuzzier if a future president were to do some
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potential for presidents to try to exercise such control in the future. The
modern IRS very well may be headed in that direction. President
Trump, for example, indicated a desire while in office for the White
House to play a more aggressive role in IRS decisionmaking.134 Such a
maneuver would break with recent norms: ever since controversies over
politicized IRS enforcement helped to take down the Nixon
Administration, presidents have tended to not exert the same control
over the IRS as they have over other executive agencies. Instead,
presidents have tended to treat the IRS, in a sense, as though it were
independent, including by declining to take policy ownership of IRS
administrative decisions.135 Yet the IRS is not, as a legal
matter, independent. Therefore, the potential for top-down
involvement remains.
Still, notably absent from these descriptions of the IRS and other
executive agencies are widespread efforts by presidents to influence
election administration in a more prominent way: through influence
over rulemaking. In other contexts, influence over rulemaking is
understood to be a particularly effective tactic for presidents seeking to
harness the power of executive agencies.136
The explanation for this absence almost certainly goes to
congressional design. Congress has granted executive agencies
markedly few opportunities to promulgate legally binding rules relating
to elections. This distinction very well may reflect congressional

variation of what critics accused Obama of doing: for example, if the White House were to pressure
the IRS to take regulatory steps or adopt enforcement policies that, as an election approached,
were likely to have a disproportionate effect on those aligned with the president’s political party.
See Clinton G. Wallace, Centralized Review of Tax Regulations, 70 ALA. L. REV. 455, 483–84 (2018)
(discussing possible politicization of tax regulations and why presidential administrations
generally prefer to avoid being involved). Compare id., with Shanahan, supra note 26 (detailing
allegations of Nixon’s IRS interference); see also I.R.C. § 7212.
134. See Wallace, supra note 133, at 478–82 (“The Trump Administration, from the outset,
adopted a more heavy-handed approach to directing tax regulatory actions, with OMB including
tax regulations in its early anti-regulatory directives.”).
135. As a telling illustration, when President Obama responded to the campaign finance
related controversy discussed above, he referred to the IRS as an “independent agency.” See Teresa
Tritch, Is the I.R.S. an Independent Agency?, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE (May 14, 2013 6:28 PM),
https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/is-the-i-r-s-an-independent-agency/
[https://
perma.cc/5NJ8-SC7E]. This characterization was incorrect; the president can remove the
Commissioner of the IRS at will. Id. The explanation may involve norms developed after
Watergate, as well as laws making it more difficult for the White House to interfere. See id.
(“Federal law does include special provisions to ban presidential meddling in the I.R.S. It also gives
the I.R.S. commissioner a 5-year term, which helps insulate the agency from the politics of the
four-year presidential cycle.”). It also may be due to a more practical desire: to steer clear of
unpopular tax measures.
136. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383,
1392–93 (2004) (“A final aspect of the procedures followed for policymaking forms is the review
mechanisms internal to the executive branch.”).
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distrust of executive branch involvement in the election context.137 DOJ,
for example, lacks power to promulgate binding regulations in its
execution of the VRA; DHS cannot issue regulations addressing election
infrastructure.138 Even when an agency does have some regulatory
authority related to elections, the scope of this authority is quite
limited, as discussed above with respect to the IRS.139 It is true that
agencies without regulatory authority still can issue nonbinding
guidance. These agencies can, for example, offer interpretations of the
relevant statutory mandates through agency manuals, letters to
regulated entities, published procedures, and more.140 As Jennifer Nou
has explained, in the context of DOJ’s administration of the VRA, this
guidance has indeed appeared to “track the shifting views of the
administration in power.” 141 Still, this guidance is not legally binding,
and courts have hesitated to accord it much deference in litigation.
Across multiple executive agencies, then, presidential influence
over election administration has centered around a fairly subtle means:
through an agency deciding how to set its priorities, including its
enforcement priorities. This pattern tracks congressional design by
reflecting Congress’s choice to grant agencies limited tools (including
very little rulemaking power) to administer election-related statutes.
Having described this general pattern with respect to executive
agencies, this Section now seeks to complicate these observations. To
this end, it acknowledges that exceptions to this general pattern may
137. One indication of this congressional awareness and intent is the specific carveout,
contained in appropriations bills, disallowing the SEC from spending money associated with
required disclosure of political contributions. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub.
L. No. 114-113, § 707, 129 Stat. 2242, 3029–30 (2015).
138. While DOJ has some generally applicable regulatory power that, in theory, could touch
on election-related matters, it does not have targeted authority to issue binding legal rules
regarding election administration. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 301 (“The head of an Executive department
or military department may prescribe regulations for the government of his department, the
conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use,
and preservation of its records, papers, and property.”); see also, e.g., Revision of Voting Rights
Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg 21,239-01, 21,242 (Apr. 15, 2011) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 0, 28) (“This
rule amends interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice and therefore the notice requirement of 5 U.S.C. 553(b) is not mandatory.”).
139. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting the IRS’s narrow latitude in
interpreting tax exemption laws). See also infra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing how
norms historically have insulated the IRS from presidential influence).
140. See Mary Whisner, Some Guidance About Federal Agencies and Guidance, 105 LAW LIBR.
J. 385, 392 (2013).
141. Nou, supra note 44, at 169. See also, e.g., supra note 120 and accompanying text (citing
the “recent change in Administrations” as an explanation for why the Trump-era DOJ reversed its
longstanding interpretation of section 8 of the NVRA, both in a filing before the Supreme Court
and in its own online guidance); Zoe Tillman, The Justice Department Deleted Language About
Press Freedom and Racial Gerrymandering from Its Internal Manual, BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 29,
2018, 3:10 PM ET), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/the-justice-departmentdeleted-language-about-press-freedom [https://perma.cc/3X5P-V7NK].

420

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2:385

be emerging—at least, in the narrow areas where Congress has granted
a broader range of powers to executive agencies administering electionrelated mandates. In these contexts, in response to increasingly brazen
attempts by the White House—in particular, under President Trump—
to shape election administration, the influence of the president has
begun to manifest in more striking ways.
The Census Bureau provides the lead illustration. Housed
within the Department of Commerce, the Census Bureau implicates
elections because the Constitution requires, every ten years, that the
federal government count the number of people residing in the United
States.142 These tallies then dictate high-level election rules, including
the number of representatives each state has in the U.S. House of
Representatives, as well as the number of votes each state has in the
Electoral College.143 In addition, these tallies determine many
restrictions on how electoral districts lines may be drawn throughout
the country.144 Such high stakes help to explain why controversy tends
to accompany the administration of the Census. Administrative
decisions can promote—or undermine—the accuracy of the
Census tallies.
Criticism came quickly, therefore, on March 26, 2018, when the
Secretary of Commerce, Wilbur Ross, announced that the 2020 census
short form would include a question, posed to every person in the
country, about citizenship status.145 For decades, administrations had
resisted adding such a question to the short form. In part, this
resistance stemmed from concerns that the question would depress
response rates, particularly in more vulnerable populations (for
example, in Latino populations) and therefore skew the ultimate
tallies.146 This statistical distortion, in turn, likely would affect election
rules in a predictable way: “Those who live in the areas of an
undercount [would] see their political power wane.”147 Of course, if an
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
143. See Justin Levitt, Citizenship and the Census, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1355, 1358 (2019)
(“This enumeration remains the basis for apportioning seats in the House of Representatives—
and, consequently, in the Electoral College as well.”).
144. Id. at 1390–94. It is difficult to overstate the importance of each of these election-related
rules; they can dictate which constituencies are able to elect their candidates of choice. See id.
at 1377.
145. Letter from Wilbur Ross, Sec’y of Com., U.S. Dep’t of Com., to Karen Dunn Kelley, Under
Sec’y for Econ. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Com. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/
files/2018-03-26_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/X56R-JKLD].
146. See, e.g., Fed’n for Am. Immigr. Reform v. Klutznick¸ 486 F. Supp. 564, 568 (D.D.C. 1980)
(“Questions as to citizenship are particularly sensitive in minority communities and would
inevitably trigger hostility, resentment and refusal to cooperate.”).
147. See Levitt, supra note 143, at 1390 (“The intrastate deprivation of political power, in
particular, will likely have predictable partisan impact depending on the local political
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administration actually wanted such a result—if an administration
wanted a change in the election rules that would reduce the voting
power of Latino voters—this relationship would produce, perversely, a
desired effect. Capturing citizenship also could have another electionrelated consequence: it could help to facilitate a technical change to
state redistricting practices in future elections that would, in the words
of one Republican strategist, be “advantageous to Republicans and NonHispanic Whites.”148
According to critics, these partisan, election-related
explanations help to capture Secretary Ross’s motivation in reaching
his March 2018 decision. Moreover, these critics argued, the decision
ultimately could be traced back to the White House, which had been
imposing pressure on Secretary Ross, an appointee of President Trump
serving at his pleasure.149 In this way, critics argued, the President was
exercising control over census administration in an effort to affect the
legal rules governing elections. Evidence suggests that these
characterizations of motive likely were correct.150
Ultimately, the central dispute over the short form ended
without a definitive ruling as to the lawfulness of the agency’s decision.
While the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in June 2019 that that the
administrative record could not support Secretary Ross’s decision to
include the citizenship question, it did so on narrow grounds.
Importantly, the Supreme Court did not conclude that the Secretary’s
decision was improper due to suspected political influence. To the
contrary, “[i]t is hardly improper for an agency head to come into office
with policy preferences and ideas, discuss them with affected parties,
sound out other agencies for support, and work with staff attorneys to
demography . . . .”). But see id. (“But to acknowledge that the local partisan ramifications of an
under-count are predictable is not to say that they will always match conventional wisdom.”).
148. Hansi Lo Wang, Trump Wants Citizenship Data Released but States Haven’t Asked
Census for That, NPR (Sept. 11, 2019, 2:57 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/11/759510775/
trump-wants-citizenship-data-released-but-states-havent-asked-census-for-it [https://perma.cc/
U7KX-3D3P] (quoting GOP redistricting strategist Thomas Hofeller).
149. See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(describing White House chief strategist Steve Bannon directing the Secretary of Commerce to
speak with White House allies about a citizenship question); see also id. at 552 (indicating that
one such conversation acknowledged that the lack of a citizenship question on the census “leads to
the problem that aliens . . . are still counted for congressional apportionment”); Hansi Lo
Wang, Commerce Secretary Now Recalls Discussing Citizenship Question with Steve Bannon, NPR
(Oct. 11, 2018, 4:12 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/11/656570447/commerce-secretary-nowrecalls-discussing-citizenship-question-with-steve-bannon [https://perma.cc/BB6X-Y93J].
150. See, e.g., Hansi Lo Wang, Trump Officials Face Cover-Up Allegations After Failed
Citizenship Question Push, NPR (July 16, 2019, 7:19 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/16/
742259233/trump-officials-face-cover-up-allegations-after-failed-citizenship-question-push
[https://perma.cc/SE83-2CCS] (describing evidence of election influence motives, including a letter
found in a GOP redistricting strategist’s documents identified “as an early draft of the
administration’s formal request for a citizenship question”).
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substantiate the legal basis for a preferred policy.”151 Nor did the Court
conclude that the decision was impermissible simply because it might
affect the rules of future elections, including in ways that could benefit
the sitting president.152 As a result, the extent to which the law allows
the White House to manipulate the Census for partisan purposes—with
an eye toward future electoral prospects—remains unclear.153 This
ruling left in place the possibility that the White House would continue
to pressure the Census Bureau into administering its election-related
rules in ways that favor the electoral prospects of the president’s allies.
And, indeed, that appears to be what then happened in the final stages
of Trump’s term.154
The role that White House influence has played at the Census
Bureau—at least, with respect to the Secretary’s 2018 decision
regarding the census short form—is unusual in the context of election
administration. It extends beyond presidential influence over priority
setting, and into White House influence over an agency’s issuance of a
legal rule. Still, this influence is consistent with the broader pattern
emerging from executive agencies, where presidents have tended to
exercise control over the agencies’ election-related administration in the
ways that Congress’s designs allow.155 Particularly when considered in
151. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2574 (2019).
152. Instead, the Court concluded that the decision failed to comply with the APA for a narrow,
politically neutral reason: because the Secretary’s stated rationale for including the question—a
transparently implausible interest in enforcing the VRA—was pretextual. Id. at 2576; see also
Leah Litman, Trump Lied to the Supreme Court. His New Census Order Proves It., WASH. POST
(July 22, 2020, 12:07 PM CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/22/executiveorder-census-immigrants-undocumented/ [https://perma.cc/6EJK-LEH2].
153. There are persuasive arguments that important limits stand. At the same time, the
Supreme Court might have been signaling its willingness to accept a similar decision if Commerce
simply had returned with a more facially plausible administrative record. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou,
Census Symposium: A Place for Pretext in Administrative Law?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28,
2019, 12:54 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/census-symposium-a-place-for-pretext-inadministrative-law/ [https://perma.cc/BM8E-5972].
154. See, e.g., William H. Frey, Trump’s New Plan to Hijack the Census Will Imperil America’s
Future, BROOKINGS (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2020/08/07/
trumps-new-plan-to-hijack-the-census-will-imperil-americas-future/
[https://perma.cc/52EKGB5A] (advancing this theory); see also Exec. Order No. 13,880, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,821 (July 11, 2019)
(detailing alternative plans to compile citizenship data in connection with the Census, as the
Supreme Court’s ruling “made it impossible, as a practical matter, to include a citizenship
question”); Hansi Lo Wang, Census Door Knocking Cut a Month Short Amid Pressure to Finish
Count, NPR (July 30, 2020, 12:29 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/30/896656747/when-doescensus-counting-end-bureau-sends-alarming-mixed-signals [https://perma.cc/X8KQ-JC4R].
155. An exception that proves the rule, in this context, is at the IRS, where the White House
appears to have exercised an unusually light touch with respect to campaign-related regulations,
among others. As discussed, an eroding set of norms may help to explain why this discrepancy has
historically existed. See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text. But cf. Toby Eckert, ‘Dark
Money’ Groups Dodge Reporting Requirement in New Regulations, POLITICO (May 26, 2020, 7:38
PM EDT), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/26/dark-money-tax-283044 [https://perma.cc/
8985-V4MS] (discussing new, politically charged IRS regulations promulgated under the Trump
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sum, these precedents suggest that a president may be willing to push
this influence even further in the future, particularly if Congress were
to accord the president greater opportunity to do so.
These precedents also suggest that this top-down influence may
make a difference not only in election rules, but also in election
outcomes. Stated otherwise, presidential control over executive
agencies affects election rules in ways that, particularly in the
aggregate, very well may affect who ultimately wins an election.
Proving up such a claim is beyond the scope of this Article. Moreover, it
may be practically impossible to do so; extraordinary difficulties often
arise when one tries to produce definitive answers to empirical
questions in the context of election administration.156 Nevertheless, at
least one prominent anecdote may help to connect, causally,
presidential influence with election outcomes.
This illustration emerged from DOJ’s historical administration
of section 5 of the VRA. Even though section 5 is now effectively
defunct,157 it is worth looking back to its implementation because of the
unique window these precedents offer into the effects of top-down
politicization in federal election administration. Section 5 has an
unusual mechanism (“preclearance”) that cuts through many of the
confounding variables that normally make measurement of this
phenomenon so difficult.
As relevant, the preclearance mechanism empowers DOJ to
determine whether a jurisdiction has complied with section 5’s
restrictive mandates.158 If DOJ concludes that the jurisdiction has
complied, that jurisdiction is in the clear: no one can challenge the
determination, in court or otherwise. Prior to the Supreme Court’s
functional invalidation of section 5, this preclearance mechanism
granted DOJ unusually clear-cut control over how, and against whom,
section 5 was enforced. In one proceeding, for example, the Bush-era
DOJ precleared a redistricting map out of Texas that, by many
assessments, violated section 5—and almost certainly would not have
been approved by DOJ appointees advancing the agenda of a
Administration, without indicating whether or how the White House was involved); Kenneth P.
Doyle, IRS Rule Change Could Aid Foreign Election Meddling, Critics Say, BLOOMBERG GOV’T
(May 27, 2020, 4:19 PM), https://about.bgov.com/news/irs-rule-change-could-aid-foreign-electionmeddling-critics-say/ [https://perma.cc/7SBK-BHML ] (same).
156. See infra notes 309–314 and accompanying text.
157. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
158. The mechanism requires that covered jurisdictions receive preclearance prior to making
certain changes to their election processes and provides the jurisdictions with two options for
seeking this preclearance: approval by DOJ or approval by the federal courts. Prior to the Supreme
Court’s functional invalidation of section 5 in Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557, jurisdictions
overwhelmingly chose to seek preclearance from DOJ.
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Democratic president. The U.S. Supreme Court later deemed this DOJapproved map to be illegal on other grounds. In the meantime, however,
the 2004 elections proceeded with the maps that were later held to be
unlawful. In those elections, candidates associated with the mapdrawing party—here, the Republicans—gained multiple seats
in Congress.159
At least in broad brushstrokes, this story out of Texas paints a
vivid picture: one in which a president seems to have succeeded in using
his official powers over elections to achieve some measure of
entrenchment. President Bush appeared to do so through three broad
steps: (1) he appointed DOJ officials who would reliably advance his
electoral interests; (2) those officials altered DOJ practices in ways that
helped to ensure favorable electoral lines for allied candidates; and (3)
those candidates, once in office, presumably served as less of a political
check on the President than would have their alternatives.
Rarely is it possible to connect these complicated sets of dots in
such a straightforward way. Other election rules—such as those
associated with voter registration, or section 2, or election-security
measures—may also be affecting election outcomes; certainly, that is
the intention of some of those seeking to influence their
implementation.160 Nevertheless, the connections (between the rules
and the likely election outcomes) are more attenuated. This attenuation
compounds even further the challenges associated with measurement,
though not in a way that necessarily undermines the intuition that
these connections exist.161
In short, Congress has assigned a range of election-related
powers to executive agencies. Yet it has given these agencies little
ability to engage in election-related rulemaking. As a result,
presidential control over these grants of power has manifested in other
important but limited ways: primarily through priority setting,
including as it relates to enforcement practices.
In response to these manifestations of presidential control, there
are at least two prominent checks. First, courts serve as a partial check.
An agency’s enforcement proceedings, for example, must comply with
all relevant rules and statutes, and the targets of the proceeding are
159. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 399–400 (2006)
(concluding that one district in the 2003 Texas maps violated section 2 of the VRA); Dan Eggen,
Justice Staff Saw Texas Districting as Illegal, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2005), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/01/AR2005120101927_pf.html [https://
perma.cc/SDA5-TU9P]. See generally Justin Levitt, LULAC v. Perry: The Frumious Gerry-Mander,
Rampant, in ELECTION LAW STORIES 233 (Joshua A. Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016).
160. See Manheim & Porter, supra note 18, at 214–15 (discussing the phenomenon of
intentional voter suppression).
161. See infra notes 309–314 and accompanying text.
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generally able to enforce these limits through judicial review.162
(Decisions not to enforce the law, by contrast, tend to evade judicial
review.163) Elections also, in a sense, serve as a second type of check. A
sitting president has limited ability to dictate how a future president
will influence an agency’s priorities. As a result, it tends to be
straightforward for a future president to reject and replace the priority
setting of his predecessor.
Despite these checks, presidents still exercise meaningful
control over executive agencies charged with election administration.
Moreover, as the next Section will reveal, presidential influence is not
limited to executive agencies. Presidents also can find ways to influence
even the most insulated agencies—that is, even independent agencies—
charged with election administration.
B. Independent Agencies: Control Through Gridlock
This Section explores how presidents influence election
administration through independent agencies. It begins by analyzing
the two most prominent agencies in this context—the FEC and the
EAC—and observes how presidents have sought to influence the work
of these agencies by pushing them toward gridlock. It further observes
that this method of control empowers presidents in uneven ways. When
the White House must rely on gridlock to advance its agenda, a
president committed to vigorous enforcement of the relevant laws tends
to be out of luck. By contrast, gridlock tends to work well for a president
preferring less rigorous implementation of those same laws. This
Section concludes with a discussion of what checks, if any, may exist to
temper presidential control in this context.
Of the hundreds of federal agencies Congress has created, it has
dedicated only two exclusively to election administration: the FEC and
the EAC.164 The leadership structures of these agencies are similar—
and striking, as Congress chose to adopt arrangements that, at least in
theory, provide exceptional insulation against presidential control.
Both agencies are independent, ensuring that, as a formal matter, once
the confirmation process is over, a president will have “only limited and

162. See Andrias, supra note 4, at 1039.
163. Id. at 1043–44.
164. Congress also created a third agency, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, to investigate
a range of civil-rights-related issues—including, centrally, those associated with voting rights. See
Mission, U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., https://www.usccr.gov/about/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/X7B3-RXWL]. Like the FEC and the EAC, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
is led by a bipartisan, even-numbered commission.
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tenuous control” over agency leadership.165 In addition, Congress
designed each agency to be led by a bipartisan, even-numbered set of
commissioners, with a majority vote required for most agency actions of
significance. As a result of this leadership structure, opportunities for
presidential control differ quite markedly from those available to
presidents with respect to executive agencies. A president hoping to
pressure affirmatively the FEC or the EAC into action is generally out
of luck; he has few tools at his disposal. Importantly, however,
presidents skeptical of the agencies’ work may, by contrast, be able to
constrain the agencies’ regulatory efforts through strategic nomination
decisions. More specifically, the president may be able to make
nomination decisions that will help to produce stalemates—stalemates
that necessarily affect how these independent agencies regulate federal
elections, including elections directly affecting the president himself.
The FEC is the more influential of the two agencies, as it bears
responsibility for the administration and civil enforcement of federal
campaign finance law.166 This charge ensures that the FEC exerts
control over a range of regulatory issues that matter enormously to
presidents and others subject to electoral control. To take one of many
examples, the FEC is the agency tasked with clarifying and enforcing
the disclosure obligations of the multitude of “outside groups” that have
relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC to
become more involved in elections.167
Importantly, Congress tried to structure the FEC to resist
presidential control.168 Initially, Congress allowed only two of its six
commissioners to be nominated by the president and confirmed by both
Houses of Congress. The remainder were to be selected by congressional
leadership. After the Supreme Court struck down this arrangement as
165. Bijal Shah, Executive (Agency) Administration, 72 STAN. L. REV. 641, 685 (2020).
166. Mission and History, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/mission-andhistory/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/F4BQ-654D].
167. 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see Tokaji, supra note 54, at 173 n.7 (defining “outside groups” and
“outside spending” as referring to “entities engaging in federal campaign activities that are not
formally affiliated with federal candidates or political parties”). Criminal enforcement of federal
campaign finance law remains with DOJ.
168. From its outset, the agency has been subject to jostling between the executive and
legislative branches. The proximate cause of its creation was the 1972 presidential campaign,
which culminated in the prosecution of over a dozen corporations for illegal campaign contributions
and, eventually, the resignation of the election’s winner, President Nixon. See Tokaji, supra note
54, at 176; see also Anthony J. Gaughan, The Forty-Year War on Money in Politics: Watergate,
FECA, and the Future of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 791, 793–97 (2016). Congress
responded to these election-related abuses by the President by imposing new substantive
restrictions on federal campaign activities, along with a Commission to enforce those restrictions.
Among other things, the new prohibitions set complicated limits on how much money can be
donated, and spent, to influence federal elections. The new provisions also required public
disclosures associated with some of these same funds. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 166.
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unconstitutional,169 Congress vested the power of all nominations back
with the president, with confirmation by the Senate. Despite this
setback, Congress attempted in other ways to curtail the president’s
influence. As a matter of custom, it insisted on playing a central role in
the nomination process by sending its preferred candidates to the
president, with the expectation they would be nominated.170 It also
baked protections into the law, including the requirement that each
commissioner be appointed for a staggered term of six years. This
arrangement insulates the Commission in at least two ways. First, it
removes the possibility of at-will removal by the president. Second,
absent extenuating circumstances, it prevents a president from
appointing a majority of the Commission all at once.171 And Congress
went still further. By statute, no more than three FEC commissioners
can be members of the same political party. Moreover, the Commission
must have at least four affirmative votes to approve official actions.172
In this way, the FEC’s statutory arrangement requires bipartisan
decisionmaking—assuming, that is, that decisionmaking is occurring
at all.173
By congressional design, therefore, the president lacks a clear
means by which to pressure previously appointed FEC leadership into
action. At the nomination stage, the president does have some power to
select preferred commissioners—though even here, he must select half
his commissioners from a different political party and receive Senate
confirmation for all. After the nomination process ends, the president
has little remaining leverage. As a result, presidents preferring a robust
FEC enforcement agenda have not been able to push the FEC
meaningfully in that direction.
The same is not true, however, for presidents disapproving of
robust enforcement of federal campaign finance laws—and, by
extension, preferring nonenforcement of the FEC’s mandates. To the
contrary, presidents preferring nonenforcement can seek to exploit the
169. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976).
170. See Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV.
625, 664 (2009) (explaining that FEC members are “chosen through negotiations between the
relevant party’s congressional leadership and the President”).
171. Occasionally, the appointment process is not staggered—if, for example, Commissioners’
terms expire without timely appointment of new Commissioners. See Dave Levinthal, At the
Bedraggled FEC, a Clean Slate of Leaders? The First African-American Commissioner?, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 11, 2019), https://publicintegrity.org/federal-politics/fec-federal-electioncommission-trump-mcconnell-schumer/ [https://perma.cc/835J-S9VK].
172. Tokaji, supra note 54, at 177–78 (describing process for enforcement); id. at 182–83
(referring to advisory opinions, auditing, and rulemaking).
173.See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 2 (2017), https://www.fec.gov/
resources/cms-content/documents/FY2017.FEC.AgencyFinancialReportAFR.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FD75-M4VP].
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FEC’s leadership structure to promote agency stalemates. More
obviously, these presidents can nominate commissioners who also
prefer nonenforcement. For such a strategy, Senate confirmation still
remains a check, but the requirement of a bipartisan Commission no
longer poses a significant bar: the FEC only needs three skeptical
commissioners to achieve gridlock. Moreover, a president set on
hamstringing the agency can simply refuse to nominate a candidate for
an open (or expired) commissioner slot. As a consequence of this
inaction, it is possible for the Commission to drop below four
commissioners, thereby depriving it of a quorum—and ensuring that
the Commission, as a matter of law, cannot “make decisions in many
areas, including regulations, advisory opinions, audit matters
and enforcement.”174
This pattern loosely describes the plight that has befallen the
FEC, where recent Republican presidents, working with likeminded
congressional leadership, have successfully paralyzed the agency.175 By
late 2013—the middle of President Obama’s tenure in office—the FEC
had six commissioners. By a 3-3 split, these officials represented two
opposing visions for federal campaign finance regulation. Three,
advancing the Democratic Party’s vision, tended to prefer more robust
enforcement of the federal campaign finance laws.176 Three, advancing
the Republican Party’s vision, preferred a much more deregulatory
approach, going so far as to question the constitutionality and value of
enforcing many of Congress’s statutory mandates.177 Though the FEC
during this time had a full slate of commissioners, it nevertheless had

174. Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, FEC Remains Open for Business, Despite Lack of
Quorum (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-remains-open-business-despite-lackquorum/ [https://perma.cc/4KWG-QXMF].
175. See Christopher Rowland, Deadlock by Design Hobbles Election Agency, BOS. GLOBE
(July 7, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/07/06/americacampaign-finance-watchdog-rendered-nearly-toothless-its-own-appointed-commissioners/
44zZoJwnzEHyzxTByNL2QP/story.html [https://perma.cc/YY24-R2Y3].
176. These officials included Ann Ravel, Steven T. Walther, and Ellen Weintraub. See Eric
Lichtblau, Democratic Member to Quit Election Commission, Setting Up Political Fight, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/us/politics/fec-elections-ann-ravelcampaign-finance.html [https://perma.cc/CM8Z-46GT] (discussing frequent clashes between Ravel
and the Republican appointees on issues of enforcement); OFF. OF COMM’R ANN M. RAVEL, FED.
ELECTION COMM’N, DYSFUNCTION AND DEADLOCK: THE ENFORCEMENT CRISIS AT THE FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION REVEALS THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF DRAINING THE SWAMP (2017),
https://www.fec.gov/resources/about-fec/commissioners/ravel/statements/ravelreport_feb2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XTT8-WLBU] (highlighting numerous occasions on which Commissioners Ravel,
Walther, and Weintraub were the only votes in favor of pursuing investigations or enforcement).
177. These officials included Lee E. Goodman, Caroline C. Hunter, and Matthew S. Petersen.
See Lee E. Goodman, Caroline C. Hunter & Matthew S. Petersen, Letter to the Editor, Chiding an
F.E.C. Colleague, N.Y. TIMES (April 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/opinion/chidin
g-an-fec-colleague.html [https://perma.cc/23H9-QSLY].
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become, in the words of its own chair, “worse than dysfunctional.”178
Describing the “pattern of paralysis” characterizing the Commission’s
frequent 3-3 deadlocks, a Boston Globe analysis offered an illustration
of an “open-and-shut case” in which a wealthy supporter of presidential
candidate Mitt Romney spent $150,000 to fly campaign volunteers to
a fundraiser:
The three Democrats on the FEC agreed with the agency’s staff that the [flight] appeared
to violate rules limiting such “in-kind’’ gifts to $2,600 per election.
But the three Republican commissioners disagreed, saying Romney’s friend merely acted
“in behalf of’’ Romney’s 2008 campaign—not the illegal “on behalf of”—and thus the flight
was allowed.
With that twist of legal semantics, the case died—effectively dismissed.179

As this anecdote confirms, gridlock at the FEC does not translate
into a power-sharing agreement; it translates into nonenforcement.180
Gridlock also prevents the FEC from clarifying the law by promulgating
new regulations, or even simply by issuing advisory opinions.181 The net
effect of this gridlock at the FEC is that, for years, “there has been
virtually no enforcement of the [federal] campaign finance laws”
at all.182
Remarkably, however, the version of the FEC described in the
Boston Globe article was still much more functional than it had become
by late 2019—a year that laid bare just how ineffective an agency can
be. In the space of six years, three commissioners had resigned. The
other three had all overstayed their terms.183 President Trump
therefore had the ability to nominate six new commissioners. Yet after
nearly three years in office, Trump had nominated only one, a
Republican attorney from Texas whose nomination then stalled for

178. See Eric Lichtblau, F.E.C. Can’t Curb 2016 Election Abuse, Commission Chief Says, N.Y.
TIMES (May 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/us/politics/fec-cant-curb-2016-electionabuse-commission-chief-says.html [https://perma.cc/Y5YF-4GXU].
179. See Rowland, supra note 175.
180. See id. (reporting an uptick in deadlock and a reduction in rates of enforcement actions).
181. Id.; Fed. Election Comm’n, supra note 174.
182. See Ann M. Ravel, Opinion, Dysfunction and Deadlock at the Federal Election
Commission, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/opinion/dysfunctio
n-and-deadlock-at-the-federal-election-commission.html [https://perma.cc/FY9R-4HXY] (quoting
Robert Kelner, “a prominent campaign finance lawyer”). This pattern of gridlock and enforcement
continued through the publication of this Article in early 2021.
183. Dave Levinthal, Federal Election Commission Regains Powers with New Member, CTR.
FOR PUB. I NTEGRITY (May 19, 2020), https://publicintegrity.org/politics/federal-electioncommission-regains-powers-with-new-member/ [https://perma.cc/R9D8-58E]. During his eight
years in office, President Obama only succeeded in obtaining Senate confirmation for two FEC
nominees. Dave Levinthal, A Dubious Anniversary for the Federal Election Commission, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (Apr. 30, 2018), https://publicintegrity.org/politics/a-dubious-anniversary-for-thefederal-election-commission/ (updated May 7, 2018, 2:49 PM) [https://perma.cc/9L5S-VTQK].
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years in the Senate—in large part because the president refused to also
nominate a Democratic nominee, as had been the custom. 184 As a result,
for an extended stretch of time, the FEC lacked a quorum. It accordingly
lacked the ability to take even basic steps, such as calling a meeting,
much less taking enforcement action or promulgating regulations.185
Eventually, the Senate did confirm this nominee—but a mere two
months later, a different Republican commissioner resigned, bringing
the FEC back below a quorum. And so, through the 2020 elections, the
FEC existed as an agency that was prohibited, by its own organic laws,
from performing its basic functions. In this sense, Trump’s refusal to
nominate candidates for commissioner ensured his preferred policy
outcome: nonenforcement at the FEC.
It would be incorrect to conclude that presidents are exclusively
to blame for all the dysfunction at the FEC.186 On the one hand, some
presidents—those preferring an energized FEC—have had very little to
show for their work. (This is at least in part because, as suggested
above, the commissioners’ staggered six-year terms, coupled with the
requirement that the commission be bipartisan, functionally precludes
an enforcement-minded president from appointing the four members
necessary to overcome gridlock and implement that president’s
agenda.) On the other hand, presidents seeking to hamstring the FEC
are hardly alone in their efforts. Some commentators have gone so far
as to argue that Congress effectively intended this result by baking
failure into the agency’s design—though studies of the FEC’s earlier
performances suggests this criticism may be overstated. 187 Either way,
184. See Matea Gold, Trump Nominates Conservative Texas Lawyer to Federal Election
Commission, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2017, 2:04 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2017/09/13/trump-nominates-conservative-texas-lawyer-to-federal-electioncommission/ [https://perma.cc/2HJH-DYGF]; Devins & Lewis, supra note 57, at 489 (describing
the expectation that presidents will “batch” nominees for independent agencies requiring
bipartisan appointments).
185. See FEC Chair: Lack of Quorum Is ‘Completely Unacceptable,’ NPR (Aug. 31, 2019, 5:17
PM
ET),
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/31/756323244/fec-chair-lack-of-quorum-is-completelyunacceptable [https://perma.cc/89H3-JJB3]; see also R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45160,
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: MEMBERSHIP AND POLICYMAKING QUORUM, IN BRIEF 7 (2020)
(listing the kinds of FEC actions that are precluded when there is a lack of quorum).
186. See, e.g., Press Release, Campaign Legal Ctr., U.S. Congress: Reform Groups Today Urge
Two Additional Congressional Committees to Investigate and Hold Hearings on Dysfunctional
FEC (Feb. 16, 2011), https://campaignlegal.org/press-releases/us-congress-reform-groups-todayurge-two-additional-congressional-committees
[https://perma.cc/3DJ7-2V3V]
(discussing
opportunities for congressional investigation of the FEC); David A. Graham, This Is Why We Can’t
Have
Nice
Elections:
The
Dysfunctional
FEC,
ATLANTIC
(July
12,
2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/07/this-is-why-we-cant-have-nice-elections-thedysfunctional-fec/277639/ [https://perma.cc/8YEU-76N9].
187. Tokaji, supra note 54, at 173 (“[T]he paralysis that grips the FEC today is far beyond
anything Congress envisioned.”); id. at 179 (discussing studies suggesting that “deadlocked
enforcement votes were uncommon until fairly recently”).
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it is clear that congressional leadership also has played a pivotal role in
the FEC’s descent into paralysis. Congress has declined to take
legislative steps that might help to break the logjams.188 Moreover,
Congress has affected agency leadership both publicly (for example, by
refusing to consider particular nominees) and behind the scenes (for
example, by insisting on providing nomination recommendations to
the president).189
The occupants of the Oval Office nevertheless remain central to
the FEC’s plight. And the electoral prospects of these same presidents
depend, at least in part, on the FEC’s execution of campaign finance
laws. As a result, the potential for a president’s self-dealing is not
subtle. Consider President Trump. As noted above, during his tenure in
office, he declined to offer nominations for the majority of open
commissioner slots—much less to appoint any commissioner committed
to enforcement. During that same time, the FEC has received a number
of complaints against Trump’s own campaign committee and
affiliates.190 Not only did the FEC fail to impose penalties during
Trump’s term in response to these complaints; in some cases, it failed
to take any action at all, even investigatory.191 For as long as the FEC
lacks a quorum, this pattern of nonenforcement will necessarily
188. Eric Lichtblau, Long Battle by Foes of Campaign Finance Rules Shifts Landscape, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
15,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/16/us/politics/16donate.html
[https://perma.cc/MF5Q-R99D]. Admittedly, as Daniel P. Tokaji has explained, it is difficult to
determine exactly what those steps should be. See Tokaji, supra note 54.
189. See, e.g., Josh Israel & Aaron Mehta, Withdrawn FEC Nominee Laments ‘Broken’
Confirmation Process, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 7, 2010), https://publicintegrity.org/
2010/10/07/2450/withdrawn-fec-nominee-laments-broken-confirmation-process (last updated Dec.
14, 2016, 2:40 PM) [https://perma.cc/R6TT-C3YV]; see also Lichtblau, supra note 188 (discussing
the central role congressional leaders play in the confirmation process—such as Senator Mitch
McConnell, the “politician who [had] long reveled in his reputation as the ‘Darth Vader’ of
campaign finance”).
190. See, e.g., Levinthal, supra note 171; Kenneth P. Doyle, Manafort Campaign-Finance
Charges Dismissed by Deadlocked FEC, BLOOMBERG GOV’T (June 24, 2019, 12:00 AM),
https://about.bgov.com/news/manafort-campaign-finance-charges-dismissed-by-deadlocked-fec/
[https://perma.cc/FD7Q-688A]; Dennis Wagner, Kristine Phillips & Kevin McCoy, Pro-Trump
Super PAC Hid Source of Donation Made by Two Ukraine-Linked Associates of Rudy Giuliani,
FEC Complaint Says, USA TODAY (Oct. 23, 2019, 1:37 PM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/2019/10/23/fec-complaint-says-pro-trump-super-pac-broke-campaign-finance-law/
4046892002/ [https://perma.cc/D5XS-7J3Q]; Cristina Marcos, Democrat Asks FEC to Investigate
Trump Campaign Declining to Pay Police Bills, HILL (Oct. 28, 2019, 1:16 PM EDT),
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/467751-democrat-asks-fec-to-investigate-trump-campaigndeclining-to-pay-police-bills [https://perma.cc/5G5H-CU2G]; Mike Spies, Derek Willis & J. David
McSwane, The Pro-Trump Super PAC at the Center of the Ukraine Scandal Has Faced Multiple
Campaign Finance Complaints, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 18, 2019, 1:44 PM EDT), https://
www.propublica.org/article/the-pro-trump-super-pac-at-the-center-of-the-ukraine-scandal-hasfaced-multiple-campaign-finance-complaints [https://perma.cc/W2R5-H8YJ].
191. Dave Levinthal, Halloween’s Over. The FEC? Still a Zombie, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY
(Nov. 1, 2019), https://publicintegrity.org/federal-politics/fec-quorum-congress-trump-elections/
[https://perma.cc/JCD7-LQT5].
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continue. The actions Trump took while in office helped to render the
federal campaign finance laws, in this sense, a dead letter, even as
applied to his own election campaigns.
The only other agency that Congress has expressly dedicated to
elections—the EAC—is also independent, with a similar leadership
structure to the FEC’s. Dysfunction at the EAC arises from many
causes.192 As a result, it presents a somewhat less clear narrative of
presidential control through gridlock. Still, its record is similar to
the FEC’s.
Created in 2002 in the wake of Bush v. Gore, the EAC’s primary
charge is to provide unobtrusive election assistance to state and local
jurisdictions.193 Its four commissioners are nominated by the president,
with Senate approval, for staggered terms. Only two of its
commissioners can be from a given political party. Yet official decisions
require the votes of three commissioners. 194 As with the FEC,
congressional leadership has played a central role in both the
confirmation process and the nomination process—albeit again largely
by custom, not law.195 Also as with the FEC, Republicans generally have
sought to hamstring the Commission, while Democrats generally have
been more supportive of its efforts.196
The EAC’s performance also has been, in some striking ways,
similar to the FEC’s. When the EAC’s work has direct political
salience—when its decisions meaningfully affect the rules that will
govern future elections, in a matter that may affect election results
along predictable lines—a familiar pattern emerges. Partisan deadlocks
send the Commission into a state of gridlock. This has been true, at
192. See Jessica Huseman, How Voter-Fraud Hysteria and Partisan Bickering Ate American
Election Oversight, PROPUBLICA (July 22, 2020, 5:00 AM EDT), https://www.propublica.org/
article/how-voter-fraud-hysteria-and-partisan-bickering-ate-american-election-oversight [https://
perma.cc/32NG-TBVR] (“Dogged by partisan infighting, the constant threat of elimination and a
budget that bottomed out last year at less than half of what it once was, the EAC has long failed
to be effective or even relevant.”); see also RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA
2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN 123–30 (2012).
193. The EAC is charged primarily with developing guidance, guidelines, and information for
state and local jurisdictions to refer to when administering elections; it also distributes some funds
and provides accreditation and auditing services. Outside of maintaining the national mail voter
registration form, however, the EAC lacks rulemaking authority. It also lacks enforcement
authority. See About the U.S. EAC, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, https://www.eac.gov/
about-the-useac (last visited October 9, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3E7R-X3MH]; see also supra
Section I.B.2 (discussing independent agencies).
194. Nou, supra note 44, at 147.
195. See, e.g., Eric Geller, Ryan Move to Replace Election Agency Leader Stirs Outcry, POLITICO
(Feb. 22, 2018, 8:01 PM EST), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/22/paul-ryan-electionagency-replacement-matthew-masterson-422725 [https://perma.cc/LQ93-9MJW].
196. See, e.g., Russell Berman, The Federal Voting Agency Republicans Want to Kill, ATLANTIC
(Feb.
13,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/election-assistancecommission-republicans-congress/516462/ [https://perma.cc/93DK-V8T9].
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least, with the ongoing legal saga emanating from Arizona’s request to
add a proof-of-citizenship requirement to the federal registration form
that the EAC is responsible for.197 In response to the initial request, the
Commission deadlocked 2-2 along partisan lines.198 Soon after, the EAC
suffered the same indignity as the FEC, with the resignation of
commissioners creating an absence of the quorum required for basic
functions.199 The EAC eventually muddled through, but only after
delay, continued controversy, and, finally, court intervention that,
years later, still had not completely resolved the case.200
Despite the EAC’s struggles, the efforts of some presidents to
hamstring the EAC are more subtle than with the FEC. While the EAC
lacked a quorum during nearly a year of Trump’s presidency, for
example, the President eventually did nominate enough commissioners
to reestablish a quorum. (Tellingly, the EAC also lacked a quorum
during Obama’s presidency—an apparent result of resistance to the
agency’s work by Republicans in Congress—thereby providing further
support for the conclusion that this agency structure tends to empower
presidents in asymmetric ways.201) The willingness of Trump to
eventually nominate commissioners might reflect the relatively low
stakes at the EAC: it has far fewer employees than the FEC; its budget
is a mere fraction of the FEC’s; and it has a charge that tends to be
much narrower, and less politically controversial, than the FEC’s.202
Whatever the reason for the disparate treatment, presidential
appointees hostile to the agency’s mission can still attempt to
hamstring the EAC’s work across multiple administrations. Moreover,
197. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 6 (2013); see also Tokaji, The
Future of Election Reform, supra note 55, at 135; Nou, supra note 44, at 139–43.
198. Nou, supra note 44, at 140.
199. Id. at 142; see also Dan Froomkin, Federal Voting Commissioners AWOL as Election
Approaches, HUFFPOST (July 31, 2012, 1:56 PM ET), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/federalvoting-commissioners-eac_n_1723939 [https://perma.cc/GQ3B-H53L].
200. See Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 772 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2014)
(describing developments). See also Final Brief for Appellees, League of Women Voters of the U.S.
v. Newby, 963 F.3d 130 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 19-7027), 2019 WL 5784590, at *1–11 (addressing a
follow-up line of litigation).
201. See Amanda Becker, The Phantom Commission, ROLL CALL (Oct. 31, 2012, 6:38 PM),
https://www.rollcall.com/2012/10/31/the-phantom-commission/ [https://perma.cc/583S-7EPM].
202. See Staff, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, https://www.eac.gov/about/staff-directory
(last visited Dec. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9X66-GGKM]; Leadership and Structure, FED.
ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/ (last visited Dec. 21,
2020) [https://perma.cc/UQC2-EU5W]. Compare U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, SERVING
AMERICA’S ELECTION OFFICIALS AND VOTERS: 2019 EAC ANNUAL REPORT 50 (2019), https://
www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/EACAnnualReport_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
9KGE-UTBK ] (reporting a budget of $15.171 million for fiscal year 2020), with FED. ELECTION
COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2020 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 2 (2019), https://www.fec.gov/
resources/cms-content/documents/FY20_congressional_budget_justification.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3FKV-D5GS] (submitting a budget request of over $70.5 million for fiscal year 2020).
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the EAC’s struggles indicate that it may head down a path even more
similar to the FEC’s if its mandates were broadened—as proposed in
recent bills such as the For the People Act, as well as relief measures
proposed in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.203
Overall, presidential influence over election rules looks different
when the power runs through independent agencies rather than
executive agencies. To the extent that future presidents become
increasingly aggressive in their attempts to control independent
agencies, these patterns might shift. 204 Still, a distinction is to be
expected. The defining characteristic of an independent agency is its
insulation from the president.
Yet, as described above, this insulation from presidential control
has a counterintuitive result—at least in the context of election
administration, where Congress has created agencies with bipartisan,
even-numbered commissions. In this context, the independent-agency
model permits some presidents greater control, in a sense, over election
administration than an executive-agency model would. This
counterintuitive result exists because a president preferring gridlock
may be able to extend his influence—even into a subsequent
administration—through strategic nomination decisions and the
staggered terms. Even more important, however, is the uneven manner
in which this arrangement empowers presidents during their times in
office. To exercise meaningful control over a bipartisan, even-numbered
independent agency like the FEC or the EAC, presidents generally
must have policy preferences that happen to coincide with agency
gridlock. Otherwise presidents lack an effective means by which to push
through their agendas.
Compounding this uneven effect is the lack of adequate checks.
When a president strategically appoints commissioners committed to
gridlock—or simply refuses to nominate commissioners in the first
place—there is no legal recourse. Even if a president’s refusal to
nominate could somehow be challenged on the merits, it is not clear
who, if anyone, would have standing to challenge a lack of a quorum.
203. See For the People Act of 2021, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021); see also For the People Act of
2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019); Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub L. No.
116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9080).
204. An example emerging out of the 2020 elections involved the USPS, an independent agency
that President Trump appeared to try to entangle in the push-and-pull of elections. See
Washington v. Trump, No. 1:20-CV-03127-SAB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171873, at *20 (E.D. Wash.
Sept. 17, 2020) (describing the controversy); supra note 79 and accompanying text (describing the
role played by the USPS in elections). Once more information emerges concerning the reach and
nature of this top-down pressure, it will be important to study the decisionmaking at USPS prior
to the 2020 elections as a possible example of presidential control over elections, particularly given
that it does not necessarily fit into the pattern of gridlock that otherwise tends to characterize
independent agencies in this context.
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And once an agency is gridlocked, there are few legal constraints on its
failure to act.205
In addition to the absence of legal checks, there may also be an
absence of political checks. Imagine, for example, that the electorate
manages to overcome entrenchment effects to select a president
committed to robust enforcement of the campaign-finance laws. For the
reasons discussed above, the president likely will not be able to use the
nomination power in a way that can overcome stalemates at the FEC,
or any similarly structured agency.
C. Direct Grants of Power: Idiosyncratic Control
In addition to running election administration through
executive and independent agencies, Congress at times uses a third
form: directly empowering the president to execute the law.206 The
president can unilaterally exercise this power through legally binding
orders. This arrangement provides the president with much greater
flexibility, including far fewer procedural constraints, than actions
taken by an agency,207 and it often appears in areas that implicate
immigration policy, government contracts, and national monuments,
among others.208 Perhaps tellingly, in the field of election
administration, Congress appears to have granted the president
vanishingly little power to exercise unilateral control. The few areas
where the president can act independently help to confirm the limits of
his authority. In these areas, the actions of recent presidents have been
idiosyncratic—closely reflective of the electoral interests and governing

205. See Andrias, supra note 4, at 1119–20. It is true that parties aggrieved by the FEC’s
dismissal of a complaint have a limited ability to pursue judicial review of the Commission’s
decision. See infra note 321 (discussing this power in more detail).
206. See MANHEIM & WATTS, supra note 14, at 17–18; see also, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.
Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018). The president has almost no power over election administration that runs
directly from the Constitution. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585
(1952) (“The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress
or from the Constitution itself.”). Two obvious exceptions come in the president’s veto power, which
he can wield strategically over legislation that affects election administration, as well as the
pardon power, which the president also can use strategically to undermine disfavored applications
of election-related criminal statutes. See, e.g., Jacob Bogage, Trump Says Postal Service Needs
Money for Mail-In Voting, but He’ll Keep Blocking Funding, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2020, 7:43 PM
CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/08/12/postal-service-ballots-dejoy [https://
perma.cc/7VGZ-CLNR]; Charlie Savage, Can Trump Pardon Himself? Explaining Presidential
Clemency Powers, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/us/politics/
trump-pardon-himself-presidential-clemency.html [https://perma.cc/9WR3-AE8H].
207. See Manheim & Watts, supra note 81, at 1793–94.
208. See id. at 1764, 1771 & n.151, 1784; see also Stack, supra note 99, at 551 & nn.42–45.
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style of each individual president—and they confirm the opportunity for
self-interested decisionmaking.
The president’s few unilateral powers, in the context of election
administration, tend to derive from much broader grants of authority.
The president then chooses to direct these broad powers toward
election-related ends. For example, presidents have the legal authority
to create advisory commissions. While an advisory commission cannot
itself create legally binding rules, it is an entity recognized by law, and
the president has the power to create it unilaterally.209 A president also
has wide discretion in deciding which areas the commissions should
explore, and at times presidents have used this power to create
commissions committed to election issues. 210 President Obama, for
example, issued a March 2013 executive order creating the Presidential
Commission on Election Administration (“PCEA”), a group dedicated to
“identify[ing] best practices and otherwise mak[ing] recommendations
to promote the efficient administration of elections.” 211 Obama—who
had famously portrayed himself as the sort of politician who desired a
“team of rivals”—appointed a ten-member Commission that was highly
accomplished, widely respected, and meticulously bipartisan.212 Per its
charge, the PCEA held meetings, consulted experts, conducted
research, released a 112-page Report and Recommendations to the
President, and then disbanded.213 The charge of the PCEA overlapped
quite a bit with the charge of the EAC, the independent agency created
by Congress. Perhaps due to concerns over gridlock at the EAC, Obama
opted to create this new commission rather than attempt to convince
the agency to conduct the parallel work.
President Trump took nominally similar action once he took
office. Through an executive order signed in May 2017, he created the
Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity, whose mission
was to “study the registration and voting processes used in Federal
elections.”214 Trump, whose leadership style invites controversy and
209. See Bybee, supra note 84, at 57.
210. An early example came while President Kennedy was in office. See Exec. Order No.
11,100, 28 Fed. Reg. 3149 (Mar. 30, 1963) (establishing the President’s Commission on
Registration and Voting Participation).
211. Exec. Order No. 13,639, 78 Fed. Reg. 19,979 (Mar. 28, 2013).
212. See Presidential Commission on Election Administration Launched, U.S. ELECTION
ASSISTANCE COMM’N (May 21, 2013), https://www.eac.gov/news/2013/05/21/presidentialcommission-on-election-administration-launched [https://perma.cc/T7WS-P29Z] (announcing the
President’s appointees).
213. See THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION, PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION
ADMIN. (2014), http://web.mit.edu/supportthevoter/www/files/2014/01/Amer-Voting-Exper-finaldraft-01-09-14-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6YU-9LPL].
214. Exec. Order No. 13,799, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,389 (May 11, 2017).
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resists bipartisanship, selected several commissioners considered by
well-established experts to be underqualified, ideologically extreme,
and partisan.215 Although Trump’s order also directed the Commission
to issue a report after conducting research, he nevertheless disbanded
the Commission less than a year later, before it had made significant
progress.216 The Commission’s abbreviated tenure was notable for the
lawsuits it generated, which claimed (among other things) that the
Commission violated federal law by failing to operate in a transparent
and balanced manner.217 The Commission was further notable for its
perceived overreaching.218 The Commission’s first formal act was to try,
unsuccessfully, to obtain voter registration lists from states—through a
request, rather than a demand, presumably given that neither the
President nor the Commission had any legal authority to require the
disclosures.219 Throughout its tenure, the Commission was plagued
with accusations that it was a thinly veiled attempt, by Trump, to find
evidence to support his unsubstantiated claim that millions of unlawful
votes had been cast in the 2016 election. Trump appeared to believe
such evidence would help him in future elections—not only by
legitimizing his victory, but also by bolstering campaigns for stricter
voting measures in future elections. The Commission, in this way,
dramatically reflected the President’s own political agenda. It also
reflected the President’s idiosyncratic governing style. In so doing, it
quickly pushed up against the legal limits of the president’s powers.
In other areas where the president has broadly applicable
unilateral powers—for example, as related to foreign sanctions—
presidents also have employed their authority, idiosyncratically, in
ways that affect elections. In December 2016, for example, President
Obama issued Executive Order 13,757, which imposed economic
sanctions
relating
to
“significant
malicious
cyber-enabled
215. See, e.g., FLAWED FROM THE START: THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION
INTEGRITY, COMMON CAUSE 4–5 (2017), https://flawedfromthestart.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/
5/2017/09/FlawedfromtheStart_Report_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA2M-LKLV]. These same
critics accused the Commission of being nonpartisan only in a nominal sense.
216. Exec. Order No. 13,820, 93 Fed. Reg. 969 (Jan. 3, 2018) (terminating the Commission).
217. See Complaint at 2, Dunlap v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, No.
1:17-cv-02361 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2017), ECF No. 1 (asserting that the “partisan” operation of the
Commission is prohibited by the Federal Advisory Committee Act).
218. Charles Stewart III, Trump’s Controversial Election Integrity Commission Is Gone. Here’s
What Comes Next., WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Jan. 4, 2018, 10:27 AM CST),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/04/trumps-controversialelection-integrity-commission-is-gone-heres-what-comes-next/ [https://perma.cc/H4MM-APNH]
(describing states’ reluctance to turn over voter registration lists to the Commission).
219. See, e.g., Letter from Kris W. Kobach, Vice Chair, Presidential Advisory Comm’n on
Election Integrity, to the Hon. Denise Merrill, Sec’y of State, State of Connecticut (June 28, 2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/PEIC_Letter_to_Connecticut.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X3Y7-5C2Z] (requesting “the publicly-available voter roll data for Connecticut”).

438

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2:385

activities . . . [used] to undermine democratic processes or
institutions.”220 Obama based this legally binding order on
congressional grants of authority that run directly to the president, and
he indicated that he took this action in response to Russian interference
in the 2016 elections, but also that he waited until after those elections
had taken place to do so. As the incoming president, Trump expressed
resistance to Obama’s decision, insisting that, in response to Russian
interference, “[i]t’s time for our country to move on to bigger and
better things.”221
Once in office, Trump continued to oppose a strong response to
Russian interference. He appeared to consider it a threat to both the
legitimacy of his 2016 election and his 2020 reelection efforts.222
Consistent with this approach, the President dragged his heels for over
a year, refusing to issue stronger sanctions even in response to growing
evidence of concerted and ongoing election interference.223 Eventually,
faced with significant political pressure, Trump unilaterally issued an
order in September 2018 entitled “Executive Order on Imposing Certain
Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States
Election.”224 Critics immediately derided this order as weak and
ineffective.225 The order seemed to promise that more sanctions would
be imposed imminently; yet months went by without any additional
sanctions or civil penalties.226 Partially due to frustration with the
President’s refusal to take more meaningful action in response to the
threat of foreign interference, members of Congress repeatedly
introduced bills seeking to amend the statutes allowing the president

220. See Exec. Order No. 13,757, 82 Fed. Reg. 1 (Dec. 28, 2016) (imposing sanctions in response
to Russian cyberattacks on the 2016 elections).
221. See Missy Ryan, Ellen Nakashima & Karen DeYoung, Obama Administration Announces
Measures to Punish Russia for 2016 Election Interference, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-announcesmeasures-to-punish-russia-for-2016-election-interference/2016/12/29/311db9d6-cdde-11e6-a87fb917067331bb_story.html [https://perma.cc/HB7Q-RG2V].
222. See Schmitt et al., supra note 106 (quoting Representative Adam B. Schiff as stating that
“[w]e are woefully unprepared because even raising this issue is met with hostility by a President
who views any discussion of election security as a threat to his legitimacy”).
223. See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, Trump’s New Executive Order Slaps a Bandaid on Election
Interference Problems, WIRED (Sept. 12, 2018, 5:30 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/trumpexecutive-order-election-interference-sanctions/ [https://perma.cc/72NU-TKB8].
224. Exec. Order No. 13,848, 83 Fed. Reg. 46,843 (Sept. 12, 2018).
225. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 223 (quoting senators and other commentators criticizing
the limited reach of the executive order); see also Stein, supra note 83 (describing the executive
order as not triggering “automatic” sanctions, among other limitations).
226. See Steven Aftergood, Election Interference Emergency Order Nets No Culprits, FED’N
AM. SCIENTISTS (May 22, 2019), https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2019/05/election-emergency-eo/
[https://perma.cc/9LG6-WFN6].
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such free rein in imposing sanctions.227 In short, Obama and Trump
each responded to Russian interference in U.S. elections by exercising
these unilateral powers over sanctions, and each did so in ways that
reflect their own preferences and governing styles.
Despite the importance of these direct grants of authority from
Congress to the president, the powers still tend to implicate elections
only in an incidental manner. Congress confers the relevant powers in
a broad way; presidents subsequently direct these powers toward
election-related ends. Very occasionally, however, Congress provides
the president with a more targeted grant of election-related authority.
Perhaps the most notable emerges from the administration of
the Census.
As discussed above, the enumeration associated with the Census
directly affects the apportionment of representatives in the U.S.
House.228 It also has a significant effect on redistricting across the
country.229 The Constitution sets forth the very basic structure of how
the Census is to be administered, indicating that Congress must fill in
the blanks.230 Congress has done so through a set of statutes
empowering the Census Bureau, via the Commerce Department, and
then mandating how its work eventually translates into the
apportionment of representatives.
This statutory arrangement, as noted, relies primarily on the
Census Bureau for implementation. But it also gives the president a
pivotal role. First, Congress requires the Secretary of the Department
of Commerce to provide the president with a report of the tabulation of
total population.231 This provision triggers the mandates of 2 U.S.C.
§ 2a, whereby:
[After receiving the Secretary’s report], the President shall transmit to the Congress a
statement showing the whole number of persons in each State . . . as ascertained under
the . . . decennial census of the population, and the number of Representatives to which
each State would be entitled under an apportionment of the then existing number of
Representatives by the method known as the method of equal proportions . . . . 232

227. See Defending Elections Against Trolls from Enemy Regimes (DETER) Act, S. 1328,
116th Cong. (as passed by Senate, June 3, 2019); Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing
Redlines (DETER) Act of 2019, S. 1060, 116th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Apr. 8, 2019); see
also Stein, supra note 83 (explaining the sanctioning mechanism of the DETER Act).
228. See supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text (describing connection between the
Census and apportionment).
229. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (describing connection between the Census
and redistricting).
230. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
231. See 13 U.S.C. § 141(b).
232. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a).
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Considering this § 2a language in a 1992 decision, the Supreme
Court refused to characterize the duty of the president as “merely
ceremonial or ministerial.”233 Instead, the Court held, the president can
exercise his own “policy judgments” in deciding whether to accept,
reject, or order changes to the secretary’s report.234 Once the president
ultimately decides to send a report to Congress, it is that presidential
action that has legally binding effect—“because only then are the States
entitled by § 2a to a particular number of Representatives.”235
The Supreme Court did not identify the outer bounds of a
president’s discretion in exercising this § 2a power.236 In the first two
census cycles after the Court’s 1992 decision (which occurred during the
terms of George W. Bush and Barack Obama), the presidents’ exercise
of this § 2a power did not appear to raise significant controversy or legal
challenges. Yet in a memorandum issued in July 2020, President
Trump signaled his intention to effect significant policy changes
through the § 2a grant of authority and otherwise use this unilateral
power over the Census in unprecedented ways.237 Critics challenged the
lawfulness of the proposed actions—including by alleging they were
motivated by a desire to affect election rules—up until President Joe
Biden unwound Trump’s § 2a efforts on his first day in office.238
It is telling that this final model for presidential control of
elections—direct, unilateral empowerment of the president—has few
illustrations. In the context of elections, Congress generally has avoided
its use. Some direct grants of power, like those involving sanctions, only
incidentally involve elections. Others, such as the role played by the
president himself in census administration, are rare and relatively
narrow in their scope.239
The limited nature of these grants may reflect Congress’s
recognition that very few checks constrain the president when he
exercises unilateral powers. Congress can, of course, impose
233. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800 (1992).
234. Id. at 799.
235. Id. at 798; see also id. at 797 (“[T]he action that creates an entitlement to a particular
number of Representatives and has a direct effect on the reapportionment is the President’s
statement to Congress, not the Secretary’s report to the President.”).
236. Cf. id. at 811 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (describing the executive’s role in the census
process, contrary to the majority, to be so circumscribed by law as to be ministerial).
237. See Memorandum on Excluding Illegal Aliens from the Apportionment Base Following
the 2020 Census, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 00528 (July 21, 2020); see also New York v. Trump,
No. 20-CV-5770, 2020 WL 5422959 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2020) (rejecting this order as unlawful).
238. See Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. ___ (2020) (vacating district court decision for lack of
standing and ripeness); id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing concern over a president using
discretion in this context “to increase an electoral advantage”); see also Exec. Order 13,986, 86 Fed.
Reg. 7015 (Jan. 20, 2021).
239. See supra notes 230–238 and accompanying text.
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substantive limits. Yet even here, it is difficult for courts or others
enforce those limits.240 Moreover, virtually no procedural limits exist at
all.241 A president exercising unilateral powers truly can act on his
own.242 Unlike with agencies, moreover, unilateral grants of power do
not provide any guarantee that expertise will play a role; the expertiseforcing mechanisms of the Administrative Procedure Act simply do
not apply.243
In short, across the administrative state, the president enjoys a
complicated, heterogeneous, and often subtle collection of powers
allowing him to exercise control over election rules.244 The way
presidents exercise this authority depends heavily on the legal
structure Congress has imposed. Yet no structure entirely curbs the
phenomenon. One way or another, the president is able to exercise
control over the administration of elections. The next Section discusses
this inevitability. It also provides reasons why presidential control of
elections appears to be on the rise.
D. The Persistence—and Likely Expansion—of Presidential Control
Presidents can, and do, use their official powers to influence the
administration of elections. Presidents do so when the changes might
have an appreciable effect on election outcomes,245 and they do so even
when the elections affected are their own. As this Section explains, this
phenomenon is to some degree inevitable: the basic structure of the
federal government, coupled with several inexorable line-drawing
problems, ensure that presidents will continue to exercise some form of
control over election administration. Nevertheless, how, exactly, this
power manifests depends on congressional design as well as the courts’
response. In recognition of this dynamic, this Section concludes by
discussing signs indicating that both Congress and the courts may be

240. See Manheim & Watts, supra note 81, at 1762–81 (discussing challenges, in the context
of executive orders, associated with exercising judicial review).
241. Id. at 1793–96.
242. See MANHEIM & WATTS, supra note 14, at 38. But cf. Grove, supra note 92, at 901–04
(explaining that, in the normal course, presidents tend to adhere voluntarily to a process
dependent on subordinate input).
243. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992) (holding that the definition of
“agency” contained in the APA does not include the president); Manheim & Watts, supra note 81,
at 1777–78 (discussing this holding and its implications).
244. These powers do not generally extend to control over the legal resolution of disputed
elections. See Lisa Marshall Manheim, Presidential Control over Disputed Elections, 81 OHIO ST.
L.J. ONLINE 215 (2020).
245. See supra Sections II.A–II.C.
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poised to act in ways that could amplify the president’s role in
election administration.
1. The Inevitability of Presidential Control
The degree, and nature, of the president’s control over election
administration varies in ways that tend to track how Congress has
drafted the relevant law. To this end, Congress’s patterns are telling. It
has vested little election-related authority in unilateral grants to the
president; has largely avoided vesting rulemaking authority over
election administration to executive agencies; and has designed the two
agencies most dedicated to election administration in a way that relies
on bipartisan, independent leadership. This pattern suggests a
conscious effort by members of Congress, over time, to insulate electionrelated decisions from the president.
Despite such effort, some degree of presidential control over
elections is inevitable. The federal government executes its laws
through the executive. Any effort to remove the president from the
process completely would run quickly into constitutional hurdles, as
well as practical difficulties.246 As a result, so long as the federal
government remains involved in elections, Congress cannot
completely eliminate a president’s use of official powers to influence
election rules.247
Even if there was a way to completely circumvent the executive
from influencing his own elections, any effort to eliminate presidential
control of elections would quickly run into problems over line-drawing.
The first line-drawing challenge arises from the distinction between, on
the one hand, presidential actions that affect election rules and, on the
other hand, presidential actions that seek merely to change voter
preferences. The former set—the focus of this Article—threatens
entrenchment and delegitimization of the administrative state in ways
that the latter set does not.248 This first set includes the many
illustrations this Article already has identified and discussed:
246. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010)
(striking down for-cause removal protections for the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
as unconstitutional); MANHEIM & WATTS, supra note 14, at 23–25.
247. Even if Congress only contemplated enforcement through the courts, the federal
government is empowered to bring lawsuits. And even if Congress decided to completely remove
the federal government from the elections process, the federal government would still be involved
incidentally. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Constitution sets a floor
with respect to how involved the federal involvement is in elections through, for example, the
Enumeration Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
248. Indeed, these election-conscious actions may actually help to promote electoral
accountability. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also infra Section III.A;
Mendelson, supra note 109 (describing and critiquing this theory).
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presidential pressure on DHS leadership regarding its election-security
mandates; presidential nomination decisions that promote gridlock at
the FEC; legally binding orders associated with the Census; and more.
Presidential actions that seek to change voter preferences, by contrast,
constitute a considerably larger set. Indeed, this set arguably
encompasses almost any step an election-conscious politician might
take. For particularly vivid examples of actions falling into this latter
category—in ways that may affect election outcomes but do not affect
election rules—consider President Clinton signing a welfare bill in
August 1996 in a seeming attempt to influence the results of the
upcoming elections.249 Or consider, more broadly, the official actions
that President Trump took in the run-up to the 2020 presidential
election, when he “obliterated the lines between campaigning and
governing” by, for example, pressuring the Treasury Department to
include his name and signature on federal stimulus checks.250
Conceptually, this line—between official actions affecting
election administration and official actions not affecting election
administration—has some force. Yet in practice it is not at all sharp. If
the president nominates judges likely to side against plaintiffs in
voting-rights cases, for example, is that an effort to influence election
administration? The connection may seem too attenuated. But then
where, exactly, should that line be drawn? Or consider immigration
policy. What if a president were to push these policies in one direction
or another, in part based on his prediction that the changes likely would
have some effect on the number of naturalized citizens empowered to
vote? Would this motive convert swaths of immigration policy into a
form of election administration? Adding to these complications is the
reality that presidential actions so often reflect multiple motivations
and have multiple effects: with a single decision, a president very well
might desire both to influence election rules and to change hearts and
minds (or otherwise affect some other change). Perhaps, for example,
249. Lily Rothman, Why Bill Clinton Signed the Welfare Reform Bill, as Explained in 1996,
TIME (Aug. 19, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://time.com/4446348/welfare-reform-20-years/
[https://perma.cc/NW8T-SEMR].
250. See David Nakamura & Paul Sonne, Trailing in the Polls, Trump Enlists His
Administration and Co-opts the Government to Bolster His Reelection, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2020,
4:59 PM CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-election-ethics/2020/10/31/
46fb0948-1b19-11eb-82db-60b15c874105_story.html
[https://perma.cc/PQJ6-2ULD].
For
analogous actions taken in anticipation of the 2018 midterms, see, for example, Ashley Parker &
Philip Rucker, ‘Pushing Every Button’: Trump Mobilizes the Government in Campaign’s
Final Days, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2018, 4:53 PM CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/pushing-every-button-trump-mobilizes-the-government-in-campaigns-final-days/2018/10/
30/009067b2-dc52-11e8-b732-3c72cbf131f2_story.html [https://perma.cc/G58K-2NGR] (quoting
one observer as describing Trump’s conduct as “the most focused and concerted effort to use all of
the powers of the presidency to shape a midterm election that I have ever seen”).
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one president might make a point of pressuring agency subordinates
into prioritizing criminal investigations into “voter intimidation,” in the
hopes of fulfilling a campaign promise. Or another president might
make a similar point out of pressuring agency subordinates into
prioritizing criminal investigations into “voter fraud,” also in the hopes
of fulfilling a campaign promise.251 In short, the line distinguishing
election rules from voter preferences is not a crisp one. While this
indeterminacy does not negate the concerns associated with
presidential control of elections, it does make it difficult to imagine a
legal regime that simply prohibits a president from ever using his
powers to influence election rules.
Another line-drawing problem emerges from a second
distinction: between a president influencing election rules through use
of official powers, rather than the bully pulpit. This distinction matters
because the law necessarily grants the president wide latitude to
engage in the latter conduct. Moreover, a president’s use of the bully
pulpit does not necessarily present the same normative concerns.
This Article, as noted, focuses on the former: how a president
influences election rules through use of official powers. These law-based
mechanisms include nomination decisions, pressure on subordinates
backed by the threat of removal, legally binding orders, and more. 252
Yet the bully pulpit also matters, including with respect to election
administration, given that presidents routinely use non-law-based
means, including their unique access and ability to reach wide
audiences, in attempts to affect issues of election administration. As an
example, consider President Obama’s letter to the editor of the New
York Times Magazine calling on Congress to expand the VRA,253 or
President Trump’s tweets discouraging jurisdictions from adopting
“Mail-In Voting” in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.254 While these
actions very well may influence election rules, the presidents did not
rely on official legal authority to take them.

251. See Manheim & Porter, supra note 18, at 238.
252. See MANHEIM & WATTS, supra note 14, at 37–38 (discussing the president’s “toolkit” for
exercising the official powers of his office).
253. Barack Obama, President Obama’s Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/president-obamas-letter-to-the-editor.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/93SA-ZNN4].
254. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 28, 2020, 7:30 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1277429217190428673
[https://perma.cc/6ALU2DBK] (“Mail-In Voting . . . will lead to the most corrupt Election in USA history.”); see also, e.g.,
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 4, 2018, 3:11 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/948874586006925313?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw
[https://perma.cc/BUE39GEB] (encouraging voters to push for voter ID laws).
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As a result, these actions arguably do not pose the same
entrenchment or legitimacy concerns as do the actions taken on the
basis of a president’s official powers.255 Again, though, this line becomes
fuzzy on the margin. Consider, for example, the following tweet by
Trump, sent less than a month before the 2018 elections: “All levels of
government and Law Enforcement are watching carefully for VOTER
FRAUD, including during EARLY VOTING. Cheat at your own peril.
Violators will be subject to maximum penalties, both civil and
criminal!”256 This warning appears primarily to be rhetorical in nature.
Yet it is also, arguably, a directive to DOJ, and therefore its effects on
that agency arguably derive, at least in part, from the president’s
legal authority.
In this sense, an action like Trump’s “VOTER FRAUD” tweet
straddles the line between a president’s attempt to exercise influence
through use of official powers, on the one hand, and through a rhetorical
or political mechanism, on the other. It is difficult to understand exactly
how to separate these types of actions into one category or the other.
Yet the law necessarily grants the president wide latitude to engage in
the latter conduct, which often constitutes core political speech. The
underlying indeterminacy again calls into question the possibility of a
legal regime simply precluding a president from exercising official
authority in ways that affect elections.
In short, in one form or another, presidential control of elections
is an inevitable feature of government. This inevitability is ensured
through a combination of constitutional hurdles, logistical realities, and
line-drawing difficulties. Yet how, exactly, this phenomenon manifests
depends heavily on the checks and balances provided by the other
branches, and in particular on congressional design. As the next Section
explains, there are reasons to believe that, in the near future, these
actors may further loosen the reins.
255. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A
Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385, 442 (2003) (discussing various types of
entrenchment, including laws that do not formally entrench but “that have the effect of
entrenching—what might be called informal entrenchments”—and distinguishing between them);
see also infra Section III.A. To be clear, a president’s use of the bully pulpit in this way may pose
its own normative concerns—particularly when the president is using his platform to spread
misinformation or otherwise disrupt the voting process. See, e.g., Aaron Rupar, How Trump’s Mail
Voting Sabotage Could Result in an Election Night Nightmare, VOX (Aug. 11, 2020, 10:30 AM
EDT), https://www.vox.com/2020/8/11/21358960/trump-mail-voting-sabotage-explained [https://
perma.cc/9S48-66LK] (“Trump, for whatever reason, has long been convinced that mail voting is
bad for him. In April, for instance, he tweeted (falsely) that mail voting has ‘tremendous potential
for voter fraud’ and ‘for whatever reason, doesn’t work out well for Republicans.’ ”). However
problematic, the normative concerns implicated by this use of the bully pulpit are not necessarily
the same as those implicated when the president uses his official powers to influence election rules.
256. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 20, 2018, 5:36 PM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1053807130120200192 [https://perma.cc/7J98-D7EY].
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2. The Likely Expansion of Presidential Control
Despite its inevitability, an important intuition remains about
presidential control of elections: something is different, and troubling,
about a president using his elected office to control the rules of future
elections. Notwithstanding these concerns, several developments
suggest that the coming years may bring an expansion of this
phenomenon. These developments include the erosion of norms
associated with the presidency, jurisprudential changes in the courts,
and the push for greater federal involvement in election administration.
Presidential Norms. The first development involves the erosion
of presidential norms—the “unwritten rules of legitimate or
respectworthy behavior” that both augment and constrain the
President of the United States.257 In Daphna Renan’s study of the
phenomenon, she discusses the importance of what she terms
“insulation norms,” which separate certain forms of executive branch
decisionmaking from the president.258 At the forefront of these
insulation norms is investigatory independence—“a set of structural
norms that insulate some types of prosecutorial and investigatory
decisionmaking from the President.”259 A lead example came in 1997,
when President Bill Clinton learned that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had been investigating possibly illegal foreign
contributions to his own reelection campaign. Despite the “profane
rage” Clinton articulated in response to this probe, he did not seek to
control the agency’s investigation.260 Norms constrained him.
By contrast, President Trump pushed back aggressively against
these norms.261 He directed pressure at Attorney General Barr, for
example, with respect to specific investigations, including those of high
political relevance involving election law.262 Trump also expressed
257. Renan, supra note 21, at 2189.
258. Id. at 2207.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 2212 (chronicling the tension between President Clinton and FBI Director Louis
J. Freeh); see also John F. Harris & David A. Wise, With Freeh, Mistrust Was Mutual, WASH. POST
(Jan. 10, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/01/10/with-freeh-mistrustwas-mutual/37ede22a-2229-46c8-9a73-7859bd54b85f/ [https://perma.cc/S6YE-B4VA].
261. See Renan, supra note 21, at 2214 (discussing, among other actions, President Trump’s
decision to fire FBI Director James Comey and the public pressure he has put on DOJ with respect
to which investigations it prioritizes).
262. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (describing the decision of Attorney General
William Barr to internally probe past FBI investigations into election interference); see also David
E. Sanger, Taking Page from Authoritarians, Trump Turns Power of State Against Political
Rivals, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/10/us/politics/trump-barrpompeo.html [https://perma.cc/DN6D-8HYU] (alleging that President Trump has been taking “a
step even Richard M. Nixon avoided in his most desperate days: openly ordering direct, immediate
government action against specific opponents, timed to serve his re-election campaign”); Robert
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interest in exercising more control over enforcement practices outside
of DOJ—including at the IRS, which for decades has been defined by
strong insulation norms.263 Most prominently, Trump’s flagrant
disregard of norms leading into the 2020 presidential election—
including his refusal to acknowledge he would accept the result of the
election and facilitate a peaceful transition of power—caused
astonishment and concern among many commentators and prominent
political actors.264 Unfortunately, that consternation was appropriate.
Trump’s conduct after losing that election, which unfolded as this
Article was entering its very final stages of publication, strained both
law and norms nearly to a breaking point.265 In short, to the extent that
insulation norms have restrained presidents from interfering too
brazenly with the enforcement of rules that directly implicate elections,
they took a direct hit in the Trump era, and it remains to be seen how
they will fare going forward.
Jurisprudential trends. A second development—suggesting that
presidential involvement in election administration may be on the
rise—involves jurisprudential trends. As the federal courts, and in
particular the Supreme Court, become more jurisprudentially
conservative,266 it may become even more difficult for judges to check
the president’s control of elections. One set of developments involves
judicial deference to the president. These lines of related doctrines
include courts’ resistance to legal challenges based on claims of pretext
(including arguments that a president’s facially neutral justification in
actuality masks motives that call into question the lawfulness of his
Faturechi & Justin Elliott, DOJ Frees Federal Prosecutors to Take Steps that Could Interfere with
Elections, Weakening Long-standing Policy, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 7, 2020, 12:40 PM EDT), https://
www.propublica.org/article/doj-frees-federal-prosecutors-to-take-steps-that-could-interfere-withelections-weakening-long-standing-policy [https://perma.cc/R7VK-YZGK].
263. See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text (discussing indications by President
Trump that he would like greater White House involvement in IRS decisionmaking).
264. See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, What’s the Worst that Could Happen?, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/09/03/trump-stay-in-office/
[https://perma.cc/
7YGY-CJD4] (describing efforts by the Transition Integrity Project to predict and prepare for
scenarios that might result from this breakdown of norms).
265. See, e.g., Rutenberg et al., supra note 26 (describing the outgoing president’s “extralegal
campaign to subvert the election”); supra note 119 and accompanying text (describing some of the
post-election pressure Trump directed at DOJ); Marshall Cohen, Chronicling Trump’s 10 Worst
Abuses of Power, CNN (Jan. 24, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/24/politics/trump-worstabuses-of-power/index.html [https://perma.cc/XG6G-G5KC] (“There is broad agreement among
experts that Trump's most severe abuse of power was his relentless effort to undermine the 2020
election and overturn the legitimate results.”); Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the
United States, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R. 24, 117th Cong. (2021).
266. See, e.g., Colby Itkowitz, 1 in Every 4 Circuit Court Judges Is Now a Trump Appointee,
WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2019, 6:32 PM CST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/one-in-everyfour-circuit-court-judges-is-now-a-trump-appointee/2019/12/21/d6fa1e98-2336-11ea-bed5880264cc91a9_story.html [https://perma.cc/J6PN-HTGU].
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actions), as well as what appears to be an increased willingness to issue
extraordinary relief in response to requests by the solicitor general.267
Offsetting this deference toward the president, at least to some degree,
is reluctance by these same courts to according analogous deference
to agencies.268
Another line of doctrine involves skepticism toward the
constitutionality of Congress’s efforts to protect agencies from
presidential control, including through novel leadership structures.269
Indeed, some prominent jurists have called into question the
constitutionality not only of new designs for insulating agencies against
presidential control, but of independent agencies writ large.270
A third jurisprudential trend involves the increasingly
parsimonious view the federal courts have taken toward private rights
of action.271 Indeed, a recently appointed judge went so far as to call into
question decades of settled precedent relating to whether individuals
may sue states for violations of section 2 of the VRA.272 As discussed
below, the existence of private rights of action help to offset presidential
control by providing a countermeasure to nonenforcement decisions.273

267. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (refusing to find that
discriminatory intent motivated President Trump’s travel ban, despite claims of pretext). But cf.
Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019) (refusing to accept a facially implausible
explanation offered by the Secretary of Commerce). See also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor
General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123, 125 (2019) (characterizing current
Solicitor General Noel Francisco as “far more aggressive” in seeking extraordinary relief than any
of his immediate predecessors).
268. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019) (addressing the deference due by
courts to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations); Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2575
(concluding that the administrative record could not support a decision by the Secretary of
Commerce). See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017) (discussing
“contemporary anti-administrativism”).
269. See, e.g., Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2204 (2020)
(implying that novelty in agency leadership structures raises constitutional concerns); see also
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 857 (2020).
270. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 179 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (suggesting that, based on “the constitutional text alone,” independent
agencies appear to violate Article II).
271. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 752–53 (2020) (refusing to recognize a private
right of action against federal officers in a cross-border shooting); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275, 288–93 (2001) (refusing to recognize a private right of action as relevant under Title VI); see
also Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Rights and Retrenchment in the Trump Era, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (2018) (analyzing the modern retrenchment of opportunities and incentives
associated with private enforcement of federal rights).
272. See Ala. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Alabama, 949 F.3d 647, 655 (11th Cir. 2020)
(Branch, J., dissenting) (concluding that Congress failed to “unequivocally abrogate” state
sovereign immunity under section 2 of the VRA).
273. See infra notes 320–321 and accompanying text (discussing the check on presidential
power that private rights of action could provide in this context).
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A fourth relevant jurisprudential trend involves a distinct but
conceptually overlapping phenomenon: political gerrymandering. Faced
with these brazen efforts at entrenchment by state legislatures, the
Supreme Court recently concluded that the political question doctrine
simply bars federal courts from judging their constitutionality.274 The
Court has expressed a similar unwillingness to engage with other
apparent attempts at entrenchment by state actors.275 These doctrines
potentially provide a shield to presidents seeking to defend their own
entrenchment efforts.
In short, the jurisprudential trends tend to point in the same
direction: more leeway, not less, for presidents seeking to exercise
control over election administration.
Possible Congressional Legislation. A third development—
further suggesting that presidential involvement in election
administration may be on the rise—involves the possibility that
Congress will pass legislation expanding the federal government’s role
in elections. It has been well over a decade since Congress last enacted
major election-related legislation, with the disputed presidential
election of 2000 providing the most recent impetus. 276 Tellingly, the
most significant change in federal election law since that time has been
the Supreme Court’s functional invalidation of section 5 of the VRA.277
Political pressure has been mounting to reverse this inertia and
further expand federal involvement in elections. The challenges
presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, convinced many
lawmakers that jurisdictions across the country needed more federal
support to conduct the 2020 elections, and even in that highly
politicized environment, they managed to secure some funding for this
purpose.278 Even before the pandemic hit the United States, moreover,
Democratic lawmakers had been prioritizing legislation that would

274. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (holding that partisan
gerrymandering claims present nonjusticiable political questions).
275. See Manheim & Porter, supra note 18, at 254–55 (explaining how, recently, litigants and
the Supreme Court have avoided an expansive understanding of the right to vote in part by
narrowly framing disputes and factual circumstances).
276. See Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 166 Stat. 1666; Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 166 Stat. 81; GARRETT, supra note 21, at 7–14
(providing a brief overview of major election-related statutes).
277. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (holding unconstitutional the
coverage formula in section 4 of the VRA).
278. See, e.g., Alana Wise, Funding for Postal Service, Mail-In Voting Stall Coronavirus Relief
Talks, NPR (Aug. 12, 2020, 7:46 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/12/901961002/funding-forpost-office-mail-in-voting-stall-coronavirus-relief-talks [https://perma.cc/6UYQ-87YV] (discussing
the Democratic Party’s fight for additional funding to support mail-in voting for the 2020 election).
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strengthen federal election laws.279 Across the aisle, Republican
lawmakers expressed resistance to most of these reforms but
occasionally joined bipartisan efforts to improve election security,
collectively producing a “raft” of proposed legislation in recent years.280
In multiple subfields—campaign finance, voter registration, election
security, and beyond—these proposals aim to increase federal
involvement in elections. With rare exception, any increase in the
federal government’s involvement in elections also expands the
president’s role.281
In short, presidential control of election administration is, in one
form or another, inevitable. It also is a phenomenon that may be poised
to grow, perhaps dramatically, in its reach and impact. The next Part
explores the implications of this phenomenon. It first considers the
possibility that presidential control of elections might have some
benefits. It then asks what is normatively problematic about this
phenomenon—and what, if anything, can be done to mitigate those
negative effects.
III. WHETHER (AND HOW) TO CHECK PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL
Exercising the powers of her office, the President of the United
States can—and does—exercise significant control over election rules.
Prominent in the background of this descriptive claim is a range of
normative concerns. Assessing the desirability of presidential control of
elections is particularly important in this moment, as lawmakers
consider expanding the role of the federal government in elections,
presidents continue to push legal limits on exercising influence within
the executive branch, and a polarized electorate increasingly expresses
skepticism toward the work of the federal government and its elected
officials.282 This Part begins by exploring the normative implications of
presidential control of elections. It concludes that they are, in
279. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281
(2020) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9080). See supra note 203 and accompanying
text; see also infra note 327 and accompanying text. Presidential candidates also offered their own
sweeping proposals. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, My Plan to Strengthen Our Democracy, MEDIUM
(June 25, 2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/my-plan-to-strengthen-our-democracy6867ec1bcd3c [https://perma.cc/UWE3-NGZ5].
280. See Nicholas Fandos, New Election Security Bills Face a One-Man Roadblock: Mitch
McConnell, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/07/us/politics/electionsecurity-mitch-mcconnell.html [https://perma.cc/Y96T-Q87Q] (connecting Senator McConnell’s
obstruction of these bipartisan efforts to pressure from the White House); see also, e.g., Michael
Sulmeyer, Assessing the Bipartisan Secure Elections Act, LAWFARE (Jan. 3, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/assessing-bipartisan-secure-elections-act [https://perma.cc/3SFE-6KHQ].
281. See supra Section II.D.1.
282. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.
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many ways, quite troubling. It then turns to the question of how to
best respond.
A. The Normative Implications
Certainly, presidential control over administration has potential
benefits. The president is elected, and this connection to the electorate
is understood to increase accountability across the executive branch.283
Moreover, a president can act quickly, and decisively, in ways that more
cumbersome governmental entities cannot.284 She can also help to
coordinate coherent policy regimes across disparate agencies.285
Despite these potential advantages, presidential control of
administration inevitably comes at a cost—a cost that is particularly
difficult to defend in the context of election administration. As this
Section explains, presidents’ influence over election administration
raises a unique combination of overlapping concerns. Viewed through
an administrative law lens, presidential control of elections not only
threatens technocratic expertise, as presidential control so often does;
it also, perversely, threatens political accountability. In this way,
presidential control of elections threatens the two central values—
expertise and accountability—bolstering the work of the modern
executive branch.286 The practice hardly looks better when viewed
through the lenses most familiar to election-law scholars. These lenses
help to focus attention on how this phenomenon may facilitate
entrenchment, which in turn calls into question the extent to which
affected elections reflect the democratic will.287
As both administrative and election-law scholars are quick to
acknowledge, many of these intersecting concerns rest on empirical
assumptions that remain impracticable, if not impossible, to verify.288
As a result, normative conclusions regarding presidential control of
elections must remain tentative. Nevertheless, the information that is
available points to a problem. The remainder of this Section provides
further explication of these observations.
At the outset, presidential control over election administration
is in tension with one of the central values legitimizing the
administrative state: the benefits provided by technocratic expertise.
Administrative institutions, largely staffed by unelected experts, are
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.C; see also MANHEIM & WATTS, supra note 14, at 37–38.
See Andrias, supra note 4.
See infra notes 289–302 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 304–308 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 309–313 and accompanying text.
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designed to have the capacity to develop and implement fact-driven,
technocratic policies in response to general grants of statutory
authority.289 If elected presidents introduce too much political pressure,
this top-down control very well may compromise the expert execution
of the law.290 Certainly, this concern applies to the technically
challenging world of election administration.
The recent census controversy provides an illustration.
Administration of the Census, like administration of an election, is a
highly complicated and challenging endeavor. Reliance on nonpartisan
experts, including career civil servants working in the Census Bureau,
can help to advance neutral values such as accuracy and efficiency.
Disregarding their views often accomplishes the opposite. 291 Tellingly,
when the Trump White House pushed officials to add a citizenship
question to the 2020 census, it did so squarely against the
recommendation of virtually every nonpartisan expert involved in the
process. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross nevertheless decided he
would include the question.292 In this way, the changes sought by the
White House, if the Secretary had had his way, would have come at a
clear cost: those changes would have eroded the value added by
technocratic expertise. This tension—between presidential control and
expertise—helps to explain why presidential control over agency
administration so often elicits criticism and calls for “expertise forcing”
reform.293 As the Census example helps to confirm, these
same normative concerns very much hold in the context of
election administration.
Yet this anxiety over technocratic proficiency tells only half the
story. While presidential control may compromise the role of expertise
in election administration, it also threatens to undermine the
289. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 268, at 75 (discussing the “the independent expertise model
of the administrative state”); Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and the Traditions
of Administrative Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1968–69 (2015) (“Presidents have worked
assiduously to increase their control over the executive branch and independent agencies, and
have used this control to engage in what has been called ‘presidential administration.’ ”).
290. See Watts, supra note 21, at 685–86 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of
increased presidential control over agencies).
291. See Levitt, supra note 143, at 1362–86 (noting the detrimental effects, judged by accuracy
and efficiency, of adding a citizenship question to the Census, which the Secretary of Commerce
attempted to do against the advice of experts in the Census Bureau).
292. Id. at 1356.
293. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 21, at 720 (“The most common response by courts, Congress,
scholars, the media, and others when faced with specific instances of presidential control over the
regulatory state has been a kind of reflexive ‘expertise forcing.’ ”); id. (defining “expertise forcing”
as “generalized efforts—both inside and outside courts—to try to force regulators to exercise expert
judgment based on apolitical, technocratic reasons”); see also id. at 706–11 (discussing controversy
over “Plan B” regulation, for an example of how these arguments unfold outside the context
of elections).
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other central principle underlying the administrative state:
political accountability.294
Normally, this works in the opposite direction, with presidential
control understood to promote accountability. “While agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to
make . . . policy choices . . . .”295 Indeed, without presidential control,
agency action might “be seen as coming from a headless and
unaccountable fourth branch,”296 calling into question the agency’s
legitimacy and possibly even its constitutionality.297 Presidential
control responds to these problems by more closely connecting unelected
bureaucrats to the electorate. This connection is particularly important
in light of the policymaking that inevitably occurs when agencies
administer statutes. Just like reasonable minds can differ, for example,
with respect to how to administer immigration statutes, labor laws, or
the Clean Air Act, reasonable minds also can differ with respect to how
to administer voting rights statutes, campaign finance laws, or the
Census Act.298
The central insight here—that presidential influence helps to
ensure electoral accountability—has persuasive force across a range of
substantive areas. Yet it is also precisely what triggers a special concern
in the context of elections. What if, contrary to the line of logic
articulated above, presidential control of elections, on balance, actually
undermines electoral accountability? What if the president’s efforts at
influencing election rules contributes to the distortion of voters’
preferences, in a manner that leads to entrenchment, both for the
president and his political allies in Congress? In that circumstance,
presidential control may be inconsistent with both technocratic
expertise and accountability.
To this end, a precedent like the 2003 redistricting out of Texas
should set off alarm bells. As discussed above, in that episode, top-down
pressure from political appointees seemed to result in DOJ
294. See sources cited supra note 1; see also Watts, supra note 21 (arguing that presidential
control furthers political accountability).
295. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
296. Watts, supra note 21, at 730.
297. See Metzger, supra note 268 (describing a conception of accountability that is “embedded
in the Constitution’s electoral provisions, commitment to self-government, and grants of legislative
power to an elected Congress and executive power to an elected President”); see also supra note 1
and accompanying text.
298. See Morley, supra note 120, at 291 (making this point with respect to differences in how
the Bush-era DOJ and the Obama-era DOJ prioritized NVRA cases); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
supra note 114 (explaining how voting-related enforcement priorities of DOJ have changed over
time). See generally MANHEIM & WATTS, supra note 14, at 37–54 (discussing powers the president
has in his “toolkit” and examples of how various presidents have employed these powers).
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administering the VRA in ways that favored Republican electoral
interests. As a result, President Bush appeared to emerge from the 2004
midterms with fewer checks on his presidential agenda than he likely
would have had otherwise.299 Given various challenges of measurement,
it is not possible to definitively prove up this causal narrative.300
Nevertheless, this pattern is very much consistent with a successful
attempt at entrenchment—and entrenchment tends to diminish, rather
than promote, political accountability.301
Even more ominous illustrations of possible entrenchment have
emerged more recently. More specifically, in the run-up to the 2020
elections, Trump repeatedly sought to exercise his official powers in
ways that appeared to be intended to promote entrenchment. To take
but one of many examples, Trump continued to use his powers to resist,
against the near-universal advice of nonpartisan experts, an effective
legal response to election intervention by foreign governments. To the
extent that such conduct signals to foreign powers that the government
will not enforce laws designed to prevent the subversion of elections,
this manifestation of presidential control poses a truly dire threat to
democratic accountability.302 Trump’s conduct after those elections
further underscores, for a wide range of reasons, the threats to
accountability that potentially arise when presidents seek to influence
election rules.303
These concerns are grounded in administrative law theory,
which assumes that a president will not evade accountability by
entrenching herself and her allies in office. These same anxieties also
implicate election law. These concerns are, in a sense, opposite sides of
the same coin. This is because giving an incumbent control over election
rules virtually always heightens risks of entrenchment.304

299. See supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text.
300. See infra notes 309–313 and accompanying text.
301. See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
302. See, e.g., David Corn, Trump’s Sordid History of Accepting, Requesting, and
Encouraging Foreign Interference in US Elections, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 6, 2019),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/12/trumps-sordid-history-of-accepting-requestingand-encouraging-foreign-interference-in-us-elections/ [https://perma.cc/6A5L-NFZR]. For a second
example, consider Trump’s attempted attacks on mail-in voting. See, e.g., Deb Riechmann &
Anthony Izaguirre, Trump Admits He’s Blocking Postal Cash to Stop Mail-In Votes, AP NEWS (Aug.
13, 2020), https://apnews.com/14a2ceda724623604cc8d8e5ab9890ed [https://perma.cc/MCE2QV93]; Anita Kumar, Trump Aides Exploring Executive Actions to Curb Voting by Mail, POLITICO
(Aug. 8, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/08/trump-wants-to-cut-mail-in-voting-therepublican-machine-is-helping-him-392428 [https://perma.cc/ES4V-5RX9].
303. See supra notes 261–265 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
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Entrenchment, in turn, threatens to undermine fundamental
democratic values.305
These risks appear all the more acute when the official accused
of entrenchment is the President of the United States. A president acts
alone and, as a result, has an unparalleled ability to exercise power in
a self-serving manner. She is not a member of a multimember body such
as Congress or a state legislature. Nor is the president competing with
other elected executive branch officials.306 These sorts of checks limit
what these elected officials can do. By contrast, there is no analogous
check restraining the president. To contemplate what can result from
this unique arrangement, consider, again, how recent presidents have
handled election-related sanctions. The erratic pattern characterizing
U.S. policymaking on this front is not partisan, per se, in nature;
instead it reflects each president’s idiosyncratic preferences and
political prospects.307 The stakes for entrenchment are heightened even
further in light of the far-reaching nature of presidential power. A
president’s control of election administration is not limited to a single
jurisdiction, but instead has nationwide effects. The expansive nature
of a president’s powers also puts into greater perspective the policy
consequences of possible entrenchment. While in office, a president
wields a truly staggering amount of authority, both home and abroad.308
In short, presidential control of elections poses serious
normative concerns. It threatens to undermine two central principles
justifying the administrative state: technocratic expertise and
accountability. In so doing, it calls into question not only the legitimacy
of federal election administration, but of the administrative state more
generally. Presidential control of elections potentially wreaks this
havoc by facilitating entrenchment, which in turn raises concerns over
the extent to which affected elections reflect the will of the electorate.
These normative implications for presidential control of elections are
both troubling and wide-ranging.
Still, these observations remain tentative, as they must. More
definitive conclusions would require empirical analyses that are beyond
the scope of this Article—and, to some extent, beyond the current
capacity of researchers. As this Article has previously suggested,
measurement of the relevant data poses extraordinary difficulties. For
example, it may be the case that presidential control of elections,
305. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
306. A state’s secretary of state, for example, may also be empowered to act on his own, rather
than through a multimember body—but only alongside other state executive officials also
empowered by the electorate, such as the state governor.
307. See supra notes 220–227 and accompanying text.
308. See MANHEIM & WATTS, supra note 14, at 35–36.
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however concerning on the surface, is ineffective in affecting actual
election outcomes—or, at least, that it affects election outcomes in such
a nominal way that it does not meaningfully break any electoral
connection or otherwise facilitate entrenchment in a normatively
worrisome way.309 An empirical test of this idea would be of great value.
But due to the many confounding factors affecting any given election—
particularly when coupled with the subtleties of presidential control—
it is not clear how to design such a study. These problems of
measurement are compounded once one considers multiple elections
and presidential administrations over time. Still, practical difficulties
of measurements do not mean that normatively worrisome effects are
not at play.
It likewise might be the case that presidents tend to influence
election administration in ways that, rather than reflecting self-serving
efforts at entrenchment, simply coincide with the shifting policy
preferences of the electorate—regarding, for example, the optimal
balance of efficiency and accuracy when regulating elections. 310 Were
this characterization correct, presidential control of elections would be
advancing accountability in more familiar ways, and perhaps in ways
that overcome any incidental entrenchment effects. This possible
defense of presidential involvement in elections is reflected in heated
debates over the propriety of how administrations (in particular the
administrations of Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump) have enforced
the VRA. Supporters of each administration often argue that DOJ’s
varying enforcement priorities simply reflect reasonable policy-based
disagreements over how to administer open-ended statutes.311
Recently, this theory has become harder to advance, given the
attempts by the Trump White House to engage in what appears to be
entrenchment with unusual brazenness. Yet for any administration,
the accuracy of this type of argument remains extremely difficult to
measure. Multiple complications stand in the way: much of the work of
the White House remains confidential; this line of argumentation itself
depends on elusive measurements of entrenchment; and,
309. Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 363–64 (2004) (discussing examples of the electorate
overcoming efforts at entrenchment).
310. While presidents might indeed influence election policy based on concerns over good
governance, rather than their own electoral prospects, history suggests that the latter set of
considerations tends to dominate. See Manheim & Porter, supra note 18, at 232–34.
311. Compare, e.g., Morley, supra note 120, at 291–92 (pushing back against the conclusion
that the Bush-era DOJ, and other administrations headed by Republican presidents, improperly
politicized the VRA), with Karlan, supra note 112, at 19 (“[W]e saw an administration transform
the Department of Justice, and particularly the Civil Rights Division’s Voting Section, from a
nonpartisan protector of voting rights into a political actor.”). See generally RHODES, supra note
120 (describing how DOJ’s enforcement of the VRA has changed over time).
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fundamentally, it assumes normative baselines (regarding, for
example, how an election statute should be interpreted or what a fair
election looks like) that are themselves hotly disputed.312 Moreover, the
electorate itself may desire entrenchment, thereby collapsing the
relevant distinction. In short, it is difficult to separate presidential
control driven by mere policy preferences with presidential control
driven by entrenchment interests. Once again, however, these practical
difficulties do not mean that the normative concerns are unfounded.
Finally, it may be the case that the underlying electoral
connection—between voters, the president, and the administrative
state—is already so tenuous that any theory of accountability fails at
the outset. Stated otherwise, perhaps presidential control of elections
poses no new normative concerns because elections are already failing
to hold the executive branch accountable or to otherwise reflect the will
of the electorate. Once again, it is not easy to test this hypothesis
empirically—though scholars, such as Nicholas Stephanopoulos,
drawing on recent political science literature, have tried, with results
generally not faring well for well-worn theories about electoral
accountability.313 Still, whatever the data show, the theories are not
going away anytime soon: vast swaths of legal scholarship, as well as
judicial doctrines, continue to posit that the electoral connection helps
to legitimize the work of the executive branch.314 If this proposition is
empirically correct, at least in part, then presidential control of
elections is a concern because it threatens to compromise this electoral
connection. If, as an empirical matter, the proposition is flatly incorrect,
presidential control of elections may help to provide a partial
explanation as to why.
In short, despite persistent difficulties of measurement,
presidential control of elections does pose significant normative
concerns, with relatively little to offset its potentially negative effects.
These concerns are most prominent when the president’s influence
actually impairs the electoral connection—by influencing election rules
in ways that make it meaningfully more difficult for the electorate to
hold the president accountable. Particularly in those circumstances,
312. See generally Manheim & Porter, supra note 18, at 236 (describing fundamental
disagreements regarding normative baselines); Lisa Marshall Manheim, Belling the Cat: The Story
of Vieth v. Jubelier, in ELECTION LAW STORIES, supra note 159, at 179, 181–82:
[Vieth] reflects a long history in the United States of politically motivated redistricting,
which . . . has been defined by a deep analytical struggle over what sorts of practices
should be accepted as fair (or constitutional) and, by contrast, what sorts of practices
must be rejected as unfair (or unconstitutional).
313. Stephanopoulos, supra note 1, at 1067.
314. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Andrias, supra note 4, at 1099
(addressing this counterargument in a related context).
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presidential control of elections should be carefully checked. The next
Section turns to the question of how.
B. Checking Presidential Control
While checking presidential control of elections has normative
appeal, it also poses a range of challenges, including those relating to
efficacy, cost, and constitutionality.315 Still, reformers need not begin on
a blank slate. Congress—as the entity empowering the president to
influence election administration in the first place—appears to have
structured many of these powers with these concerns in mind.316 And
so each of Congress’s efforts presents a model to consider. As discussed
above, Congress has relied primarily on three basic models: an
executive-agency model with little rulemaking power; an independentagency model with an even-numbered, bipartisan commission; and
limited grants of unilateral power to the president. Each of these
frameworks has flaws. Yet tweaks to these preexisting structures,
particularly when coupled with doctrinal changes in the courts, may
help to minimize, at an acceptable cost, the most problematic forms of
presidential control.
This Section will discuss how reformers might begin this
process. It recognizes that these congressional models reveal at least
four areas where, under current law, the president is able to exercise
control over elections without significant checks. These include
nonenforcement decisions; induced gridlock; unilateral exercise of
presidential power; and unchartered waters—what this Article calls
places where presidents generally have not ventured, but soon might.
For each of these areas, appropriate reforms would look to
install meaningful checks by empowering entities outside the
executive branch.
In taking this approach, this Section resists the temptation to
try to identify a sweeping cure-all. It instead recognizes that no panacea
for this complicated set of issues could possibly exist. Control over
election administration is a highly problematic form of power, one
whose threats to democratic values can be managed but not
neutralized. Control over election administration is inherently
problematic: the exercise of this type of power by any official helps to
shape electoral mechanisms that, directly or indirectly, are intended to
justify and check that official’s exercise of power in the first place.
315. See supra Section III.A.
316. See supra Section II.D.1 (explaining how the ways Congress has designed these grants of
power, across all three of the basic models, suggest a conscious effort by lawmakers to insulate
election-related decisions from the president).
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Stated otherwise, even if it were possible to completely remove the
president from the process of election administration,317 that authority
would have to reside somewhere—and no locus of power provides a
perfect solution. Assigning powers of election administration to any
other elected official implicates similar normative concerns relating to
entrenchment and, particularly in the case of multimember legislative
bodies, strains their institutional capacities. Assigning these powers to
politically insulated bureaucrats—those truly independent of electoral
politics—poses its own threats to legitimacy and also implicates risks
of capture, which can lead to particularly ominous forms of
entrenchment. Assigning these powers to other unelected bodies—such
as courts—not only threatens to overcome their own institutional (and
constitutional) capacities; it also may undermine their legitimacy in the
eyes of the electorate.318 None of these observations should be taken to
suggest that these alternative actors should be removed completely
from the project of election administration. To the contrary, each serves
as a necessary contributor. Instead, these observations confirm the
need for nuanced reform—and, ultimately, a regime whereby this
problematic form of power is exercised in cabined ways, by different
actors, all subject to meaningful checks.
The U.S. Constitution itself provides a model for managing such
problematic forms of power, through its dogged reliance on checks and
balances.319 This Article proposes an analogous approach. Rather than
trying to eliminate this problematic form of power, legislators and
jurists should seek to ensure that control of election administration
runs through different entities, on parallel tracks, thereby ensuring
adequate checks on each—including the president.
This approach requires identifying areas where a president can
exercise control without robust checks. As noted above, several areas
stand out in this regard: nonenforcement decisions; induced gridlock;
and unilateral presidential orders. A fourth area of concern involves
unchartered waters—the places where prior presidents have not
ventured, but where they soon might, particularly in light of the
breakdown of norms. For each of these areas, appropriate reforms
would look to install meaningful counterbalance by empowering
entities outside the executive branch.

317. But see supra Section II.D (explaining why it is not possible to remove the president
entirely from the process).
318. See Renan, supra note 21, at 2273, 2281 (“[T]he judicial role in presidential norm
enforcement should be limited. Courts cannot solve the problems of constitutional governance.”).
319. This high-level approach also is reflected in a recent essay by Edward B. Foley. See Foley,
supra note 20, at 139.
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The first comes in the area of nonenforcement. In response to
nonenforcement decisions by the executive branch, Congress struggles
to respond, and the courts are notoriously hesitant to intervene.320 To
some extent, the only effective check comes in the next presidential
election, when dissatisfied voters theoretically can vote in a more
committed chief executive (assuming, of course, that they can overcome
any entrenchment effects). In the meantime, however, a partial solution
does come through robust private rights of action.321 When the executive
branch will not enforce a statutory mandate, private rights of action
allow outside actors to pick up at least some of the slack. Unfortunately,
private rights of action do not exist, or their availability is limited or in
dispute, in important areas of election administration.322 Congress
should clarify that these rights of action exist and also pass measures
to better facilitate their use. The courts, meanwhile, should reconsider
their growing resistance to recognizing and accommodating
these private rights of action, particularly in the context of
election administration.323
A second area with feeble checks emerges out of a related issue:
agency gridlock. Many—scholars, judges, politicians, and members of
the gridlocked agencies themselves—have roundly criticized this
phenomenon, particularly as it relates to the FEC.324 The concerns
raised by presidential control of elections add further fuel to this fire.
From this perspective, Congress’s attempt at curbing presidential
control—through a bipartisan, evenly numbered leadership team with
tenure protections—has not been a success. Perhaps this perverse
result was intentional.325 Regardless, as a means of curbing presidential
control, the current structures of the FEC and EAC are hard to defend.
The structure grants some presidents too much power. It grants other

320. See Andrias, supra note 4, at 1034 (“Nonenforcement in particular, which is subject to
few judicial checks, has proved to be an important tool for advancing the presidential agenda.”);
see also, e.g., Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 892 F.3d 434, 438–40 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(discussing the validity and jurisprudential support for an “agency’s prerogative not to proceed
with enforcement”).
321. Another possibility is to give individuals the statutory right to challenge agencies’ nonenforcement decisions. However attractive this option might be in theory, an apparent attempt by
Congress to confer this power vis-à-vis the FEC has not accomplished much in practice. See
Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash.v. Am. Action Network, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2019)
(“To the Court’s knowledge, this is the first suit to be filed under FECA’s citizen-suit provision.”);
see also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 892 F.3d at 440 (“[A]n agency’s exercise of
prosecutorial discretion is not subject to judicial review.”).
322. See supra notes 271–272 and accompanying text.
323. See supra Section II.D.2 (discussing jurisprudential trends).
324. See, e.g., Tokaji, supra note 54, at 179–84 (criticizing the “frequency and intensity of party
line deadlocks” at the FEC).
325. See supra Section II.B.
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presidents too little.326 Some changes to the commission structure, such
as replacing the even-numbered commission with an odd-numbered
commission or revisions to the quorum rules, may help to reduce these
opportunities for gridlock.327 Other tweaks, such as the gridlockresisting judicial doctrines advanced by Jennifer Nou, are steps in the
right direction.328 Without such changes, the opportunity for gridlock
will continue to produce an unfortunate and counterintuitive result:
independent agencies proving, in fundamental respects, to be worse
than executive agencies for purposes of curbing presidential control.
As for unilateral presidential control, this implicates a third
area with inadequate checks. Congress should act more aggressively on
its apparent intuition that this form of control is particularly
problematic in the context of elections. It is hard for courts to enforce
substantive limits over direct grants of power to the president. 329 Very
few procedural limits even exist.330 The result is what one might expect:
an erratic set of decisions that track the idiosyncratic preferences—or,
even more troublingly, the electoral prospects—of the sitting president.
Admittedly, there is one offsetting benefit potentially associated with
unilateral presidential control: the clarity with which the president acts
as the decisionmaker, which theoretically facilitates efforts by voters to
hold the president politically accountable. Otherwise, however, this
regime provides little incentive for a president to effectuate the
concerns of the electorate, rather than advance her own interest in
entrenchment. In short, this form of control poses particularly acute
normative concerns. To this end, it is telling that even in the
hyperpolarized political environment that dominated the Trump era,
Congress worked on a bipartisan basis to try to strip some unilateral
power from the presidency in the area of elections. 331 Congress should
326. See supra notes 174–180 and accompanying text.
327. See, e.g., Tokaji, supra note 54 (identifying and criticizing possible reforms). Notably,
some of these reforms appear in a bill recently introduced in the House of Representatives. See
Federal Election Administration Act of 2017, H.R. 3953, 115th Cong. (2017).
328. See Nou, supra note 44, at 138 (proposing “an institutional understanding of Skidmore
deference to interpretive documents prepared by politically insulated actors within electionrelated administrative agencies”); see also id. at 177 (questioning whether courts should adhere to
a form of election-administration exceptionalism, in light of the “unique problems of federal
election administration”); Jennifer Nou, Administering Democracy: Policing a Partisan Census,
TAKE CARE BLOG (Apr. 22, 2019), https://takecareblog.com/blog/policing-a-partisan-census
[https://perma.cc/DA4E-3YP4] (arguing that “arbitrary and capricious review should be more
searching in the electoral context”).
329. Manheim & Watts, supra note 81, at 1769–74 (discussing the unsettled nature of judicial
review for presidential orders).
330. Id.
331. More specifically, Congress stripped some power from the presidency in response to
President Trump’s controversial exercise of unilateral power over election-related sanctions, and
it contemplated further steps. See supra Section II.C.
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expand these efforts—including with respect to the narrow but
potentially consequential form of control the president can exercise over
the Census via 2 U.S.C. § 2a.332
A final area warranting attention looks to the future, where a
president seeking control over election administration might be willing
to break new ground. At least two areas of possibility are of particular
importance. The first involves control over election-related rulemaking.
Were Congress to move more of this power to create legally binding
orders to executive agencies—or if, with respect to regulatory power of
the IRS, the president were to disregard norms separating his own
preferences from that agency’s work—the president may begin to
influence these rulemakings in a way that dramatically expands the
scope of presidential control. This development would exacerbate the
threat of entrenchment. In this circumstance, judicial review plays an
invaluable check. Courts have the ability to develop and enforce
doctrines pushing back against inappropriate forms of rulemaking.333
Here, a significant challenge would be in designing doctrines able to
suss out and resist improper political influence in agency rulemaking.334
The precise shape that these doctrines could take, particularly as
applied to election administration, deserves extensive study. Outside
the context of election administration, both courts and scholars are
turning their attention to these questions. This area of the law
nevertheless remains unsettled, 335 with presidential control of elections
helping to confirm the urgency of this ongoing work.
The second area of future concern involves presidents
intervening in individual enforcement actions for political purposes. As
discussed above, recent norms prohibiting this sort of behavior
developed out of the scandals engulfing Richard Nixon’s presidency,
including as a response to Nixon’s commandeering of the IRS to help
friends and hurt foes in support of his own reelection efforts.336 If
332. See supra notes 231–238 and accompanying text.
333. See, e.g., Manheim & Watts, supra note 81, at 1748 (suggesting that the recent rise in
litigation aimed at President Trump may indicate “an enduring change in the way litigants
challenge executive-branch policies”); Watts, supra note 21, at 727 (outlining doctrinal
mechanisms through which courts can manage presidential control, including “statutorily facing
rules,” “transparency-enhancing mechanisms,” and “process-forcing rules”); cf. supra Section II.D
and accompanying text (discussing current jurisprudential trends that may be headed in a
different direction).
334. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 21 (explaining that there are both positive and negative
aspects of presidential influence on agency rulemaking).
335. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Administrative States: Beyond Presidential
Administration, 98 TEX. L. REV. 265, 282–83 (2019) (describing developments in presidential
administration, corresponding shifts in Supreme Court jurisprudence, and how the role of states
complicates the implications of both).
336. See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.
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presidents were to follow Trump’s lead in allegedly reviving this
approach to selective enforcement,337 it will be imperative for Congress
and the courts to identify ways to aggressively curtail such behavior.338
This list of concerns and corresponding proposals is hardly
comprehensive. Instead, it is a start to the project of unpacking the
many implications of presidential control of elections. It is important to
consider these implications not only in response to isolated incidents or
concerns, but also in a holistic manner. After all, the effects that a
president has over elections are cumulative, with the sum potentially
worse than the parts. By carefully examining and, as appropriate,
checking this phenomenon across the executive branch, reformers may
be able to advance values such as technocratic expertise and political
accountability, all while helping to increase the degree to which election
results reflect the will of the electorate. Each of these conditions is vital
in a democracy.
CONCLUSION
Elections undergird the modern administrative state. They
determine who serves as the chief executive atop a sprawling branch of
government. Elections also determine who serves in Congress, the
branch charged with checking—and, to a large extent, defining—the
scope of executive power. For these reasons, elections normally are
understood to help justify and moderate not only the president’s own
efforts in office, but also the vast work accomplished by administrative
agencies. In both legal scholarship and judicial doctrines, this electoral
connection appears routinely, and prominently, as a legitimizing force.
Yet as this Article has explained, there is a strain in the basic
logic underlying this electoral connection. At core, the model takes as a
given that the elections purporting to legitimize the president’s time in

337. See, e.g., Matt Ford, Trump Conscripts DOJ into His Reelection Campaign, NEW
REPUBLIC (Feb. 14, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/156585/trump-conscripts-doj-reelectioncampaign [https://perma.cc/FJ9A-4QS5] (“[President Trump] appears to be eager to use [his]
powers to advance his own personal political interests.”).
338. In response to these developments, commentators have been attempting to identify the
governing legal principles and propose appropriate responses. See, e.g., No “Absolute Right” to
Control DOJ: Constitutional Limits on White House Interference with Law Enforcement Matters,
PROTECT DEMOCRACY 29–35 (2018), https://protectdemocracy.org/resource-library/document/noabsolute-right-control-doj/ [https://perma.cc/F7NF-S3CW]; Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can
the President Control the Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 72–73 (2018) (“The effort to
exert total control over DOJ is part of a larger pattern in which [President Trump] has undermined
the institutions of democracy and the rule of law . . . .”). I am indebted to Joshua Sellers for an
informative discussion addressing the many ways that Congress could consider reforming
agencies, as well as exercising its own oversight powers, to deter these potential abuses and also
to bring them light.
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office serve as an exogenous referendum on the president’s
performance. In light of presidential control of elections, however, this
assumption starts to break down. The elected head of the executive
branch has legal tools to affect election rules in consequential ways. By
using these tools to tilt electoral playing fields in his favor, the president
does more than simply influence election outcomes (though that effect
alone is, of course, of great significance). He also threatens the lines of
accountability that purport to legitimize his use of these legal tools in
the first place.
Understanding the normative implications of this phenomenon
requires examining how it manifests in practice. As this Article has
demonstrated, presidential control of elections manifests in ways that
tend to track how Congress has structured the relevant grant of power.
These patterns demonstrate that congressional attempts at agency
insulation from the president may at times backfire, as they empower
the president to control election administration in significant but
erratic ways that at times lack a meaningful check. These forms of
control raise serious normative concerns. Without adequate checks,
presidential control of elections threatens to undermine both
technocratic expertise and accountability, two principles underlying the
administrative state. The phenomenon also heightens risks of
entrenchment, which in turn raises concerns over the extent to which
affected elections reflect the will of the electorate.
It is time to consider course corrections. Congress and the courts
should identify specific areas where the president’s influence over
election administration lacks an effective check and empower other
political actors to counterbalance the president’s influence in those
spaces. This approach reflects a longstanding insight about inherently
problematic forms of governmental power: sometimes they must be
managed, rather than eliminated. For these particularly tricky forms of
official authority, checks and balances offer a promising way forward.

